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Abstract
The information technology industry is one of the most rapidly growing yet
concentrated markets existing today. Big Tech monopolies and their increasingly
anticompetitive behavior posits risks for competition, technological innovation and
consumer welfare. This ranges from price discrimination, limiting consumer choices to
the unethical use of data. The particular nature of information technology, with its
network effects and negligible marginal costs, incentivizes and facilitates predatory
market practices making antitrust analysis in this industry extremely complex. Certain
schools of antitrust thought are more sensitive (namely the post-Chicago school) to these
implications than others, though antitrust application is still lacking in both the European
Union and the United States. This thesis thoroughly analyzed the landmark Microsoft and
Google antitrust cases to find that it is imperative to increase antitrust oversight globally
and identified the specific technological elements that antitrust bodies need to pay
attention to in order to improve their antitrust applications in the information technology
industry.
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Chapter 1:
INTRODUCTION
It is often a commonly held notion that antitrust legislations curtail innovation.
For most, this fear is based on partisan political beliefs, but for others it is their
confidence in the abilities of the free markets to regulate themselves that lead them to
believe that any hindrance to that process is subsequently harmful to innovation. Every
day another industry in the world becomes integrated and dependent on information
technology; everyone is reliant on the continued innovation in this field for continued
growth in all other sectors of the economy. Given how important it is for everyone to
foster an environment for innovation in the information technology industry, it is no
surprise that many have spoken out specifically against antitrust legislations in this
industry. However, this paper poses the opposite question, asking instead if the
information technology industry is in dire need of more antitrust oversight. The leading
antitrust bodies pursuing cases against information technology industries have simply not
been sensitive enough to the extent of market abuses conducted by information
technology monopolies. This thesis thoroughly analyzes two landmark antitrust cases to
find if more regulation is needed and if it is, what the antitrust bodies need to pay
attention to in order to increase oversight for improving competition and innovation in
this industry.
1

The markets within the information technology industry are possibly some of the
most concentrated industries1 existing today. Most monopolies in this industry have not
only made revenues comparable to those in the natural resources and automobiles
industries2 but are also growing constantly due to merging vertically and horizontally as
newer information technology markets are created. Their dominance in the largest and
smallest markets shows the extent to which they have made themselves omnipresent in
all facets of consumer and industrial technology today. This has come alongside a global
sphere of influence and increasingly blurring ethics regarding to their consumer conduct.3
While many have argued that they are deserving of their market dominance due to the
superiority of their products and that the market would self-regulate any bad players in
the long-term, the last 50 years of minimal oversight in this sector is proof that this is not
the case.
While innovation is loosely invoked in most debates around this topic,
competition is often sidelined. There are too many uncertainties in the real world to
accomplish perfect competition, but that being said, both sides of the legislation debate
should agree on striving to achieve a more competitive environment for firms to compete
in, despite their disagreements on the methods of accomplishing this outcome.

1

Taschdjian Martin and Alleman James, “Antitrust Failures: The Internet Giants,” in 29th European Regional
Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): “Towards a Digital Future: Turning Technology
into Markets?,” 2018. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/184969/1/Taschdjian-Alleman.pdf
2
Clifton Leaf, “How the World’s Biggest Companies Fight to Stay Ahead,” Fortune, 2019,
https://fortune.com/2019/07/22/global-500-industry-dominance/.
3
Kevin Granville, “Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout Widens,” The New York
Times, March 19, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analyticaexplained.html.

2

A competitive environment (along with a variety of factors) is conducive to fostering
innovation.4 Monopolies, on the other hand, tend to engage in anticompetitive predatory
behavior that not only reduces competition but also affects future innovation. It is also
important to recognize that the technologies employed by the monopolies in this industry
help facilitate even more market abuses than common monopolies. It is therefore,
imperative for antitrust bodies to take on a more active role in implementing legislation in
the information technology sector given how vital it is to the global economy, particularly
as the current monopolies in this sector could pose detrimental effects to innovation and
consumer welfare. For them to do this, they need to recognize the limitations in their
current implementations, identify the unique nature of information technology industries
and be flexible in their interpretations and applications of the law to fully enact the
needed antitrust measures.
The information technology industry is not uncommon in how it can reach a
global market, but it is unique because most software products that they make available
have little to no distributional costs and can now reach a much larger consumer base than
ever seen before. This makes the market concentration harder to unilaterally assess and
regulate by any one antitrust body. For the purposes of this paper, the United States and
the European Union have been chosen for having already built antitrust cases against two
of the biggest monopolies in the information technology sector (i.e. Microsoft and
Google). They also happen to be two of the most influential global governing bodies
holding a large part of the world’s population. Their successes and failures in being able

4

Richard Gilbert, “Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition--Innovation Debate?,” Innovation
Policy and the Economy (The University of Chicago PressThe National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006),
https://doi.org/10.2307/25056183.
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to administer antitrust legislations are important to analyze for future decisions that could
be made by other important legislative bodies with large populations and growing
geopolitical influences (i.e. China and India). That being said, it is also important to fully
grasp the schools of thought influencing the implementation of antitrust in the United
States and the European Union before delving into the case studies, as these heavily
dictated the outcomes of the cases they undertook and could also shed some light into
which schools may be more sensitive to the misconducts in information technology
specifically. The antitrust bodies in the United States are primarily influenced by the
Chicago School thinkers who prioritize consumer welfare and efficiency over
competition5, whereas their European counterparts are more influenced by Post-Chicago
thinkers notable for their stricter interpretations of competitive fairness. This continental
divide in ideas was thoroughly explored in Chapter 2 to inform the readers of how
monopolies and their behaviors are harmful, but also how different interpretations can
affect the degree to which certain behaviors are considered harmful to competition and
welfare. This also helped to set the legal framework around competition economics
needed to better analyze the case studies explored in the later chapters.
The two important elements tackled in this research paper were antitrust and
information technology. It was imperative that the discussion and research asked how the
current literature on technology and information technology could be used to better
understand market abuses conducted by information technology monopolies. Though
there had been plenty of writing around technology previously, much of it had portrayed

5

Richard A. Posner, “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 127, no. 925
(1979), https://doi.org/10.2307/3311787.
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it as an exogenous variable to the production process.6 Joseph Schumpeter was one of the
earliest writers to present the alternative of a more dynamic view of technology and
identified it as an essential driving force behind capitalist economies rather than just
being a byproduct.7 This helped set the foundation for some of the more nuanced theories
present regarding technology and information technology today. Chapter 3, explored
these ideas and elaborated how the nature of information technology facilitated
anticompetitive behavior like price discrimination, illegal bundling and the creation of
other artificial barriers to entry. This chapter also remarked on how the limitations in the
current literature surrounding certain topics in information technology like the lack of
consensus in regard to the economic value of data and multiple levels of vertical market
integrations within software platforms inhibited antitrust evaluations. It was vital to this
research to have fully examined how information technology monopolies could
theoretically be harmful to competition in order to proceed with the evaluation of the case
studies to see if it was applicable in actuality, across two different settings and under two
different antitrust schools of thought.
The Microsoft case from the 1980s in the United States and the Google cases
from 2010s in the European Union were selected due to their sheer scale8 at the time of
the cases and the similarity in the patterns of market abuses exhibited by both of these
information technology monopolies. The technical details of the landmark cases and their

6

Nathan Rosenberg, Exploring the Black Box, Exploring the Black Box, 1994,
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511582554.Rosenberg, Nathan. “Exploring the Black Box : Technology, Economics,
and History.” Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, England: 1994), 11.
7
Ibid.
8
Statista, “Search Engine Market Share Worldwide,” 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwidemarket-share-of-search-engines/.
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counterparts (if there were any) in the other jurisdiction were explored in-depth in
Chapter 4. It should be noted that the case studies presented in this paper are extensively
detailed to help illustrate all the technical elements of anticompetitive behaviors exhibited
by information technology monopolies. This understanding of all the technical details
along with the context from the previous chapters regarding antitrust and information
technology allows for the analysis in Chapter 5, which helps confirm the hypothesis of
this paper. The economic discourse and the limitations in antitrust applications in both
cases are evaluated to conclude that the implementation of antitrust is lacking in the
information technology sector. The paper also used its findings from the literature and the
case studies to note what the antitrust bodies need to be sensitive and flexible about in the
future in order to improve the implementation of antitrust laws. It is imperative that they
increase their oversight with a full understanding of the economics behind the technology
they are regulating to ensure better competition, welfare and innovation in the future.

6

Chapter 2:
ANTITRUST LAWS: A RETROSPECTIVE
2.1. Introduction
The United States had a 70-year head start compared to its neighbors across the
Atlantic when it came to shaping the legal environment around competition and the rules
that regulated it. Though it served as the foundation for the competition laws written in
Europe, the nature of antitrust legislation and enforcement is notably different from those
in the United States today due to the specific historical, socio-political and economic
demands of each setting. For a better understanding of antitrust history, from its
conception to the many reforms that is has faced, it is imperative to look at the history of
antitrust laws in the United States given how the formative ideas on antitrust laws were
implemented here first. The first half of this chapter goes into depth regarding the
historical and economic variables that led to the changes in antitrust legislation in the
United States and makes a note of its introduction in the European continent. The second
half of this chapter then analyzes the theoretical influences in both the United States and
the European Union over the latter years and is a deeper examination into the ideological
divide that led to the differences in the enforcement of the laws we see today. It should be
noted that these two legislative bodies have been chosen for because of the level of
influence that they wield on global commerce and also because they have already taken
on cases regarding information technology. While other countries like China and India
7

with their large populations will become integral to global antitrust enforcement in the
future, due to the limited scope of this paper, only the United States and the European
Union have been chosen for this analysis. This chapter should provide a substantial
understanding of the history and theoretical influences behind antitrust laws to better
comprehend the continental divide in the current state of competition law today.
2.2. Historical Background of Antitrust Laws
While the history of antitrust laws in the United States and the many interesting
cases that accompany it can be analyzed in seemingly endless ways, a narrower focus has
been adopted for this paper. The intersection of many political, social, institutional and
economic circumstances led to the conception and the reformations in antitrust laws and
that a single causal relationship cannot be established with any variable in isolation. That
being said, historically, the evolution of technological change and distribution9 was one
of the many interesting economic phenomena that preceded reforms in antitrust law.
Taking the “technology” lens to look at antitrust history is by no means a suggestion that
any of the other economic variables are any less significant, but the perspective provides
insight into the specific stages of technological and distributional changes that influenced
antitrust laws in certain historical contexts. This section will examine these patterns in
technology and distribution in a generalized way, but where data is available, it will also
attempt to refer to how Duménil et al. (1997) intended, which is through the use of longrun trends in labor productivity, real wages, capital-labor ratio, capital productivity and

9

Gerard Duménil, Mark Glick, and Dominique Levy, “The History of Competition Policy as Economic History,”
Antitrust Bulletin 42, no. 2 (1997): 373–416, https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X9704200203.
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the rate of profit on fixed assets.10 It should add an interesting dimension to the historical
context behind these laws.
2.2.1 Sherman Act (1890)
The late 19th century saw a boom in big industries in the United States; the
“Second Industrial Revolution” had led to a big surge in innovation and growth in
agriculture, industries, transportation networks and other sectors around the country.11
This led to a fall in prices and a rise in real wages, but the sudden rise in the number of
big businesses led to some skepticism from many people.12 The rise in the number of big
businesses threatened the traditional sector of the economy as they could not keep up
with the cutthroat competition and falling profits that the bigger firms could keep up
with.13 The big firms formed cartels and trusts that further disempowered small
entrepreneurs and the people feared that this would have adverse democratic effects as
well.14 The Populist movement played a significant role in building the “antimonopoly
sentiments” during that time, especially with their push towards reforming the railroad
companies.15 Overall, competition was in crisis and tensions were running high around
the country with the big “us and them” narrative at play which ultimately led Congress to
use its constitutional power to create the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. The Sherman
Act prohibited the restraints of trade like trusts and cartels, and also prohibited attempts
of monopolization. Though the purpose of the bill was to protect the traditional side of
10

Ibid., 375.
Laura Phillips Sawyer, “US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective,” Harvard Business School Working
Paper 19–110 (2019), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication Files/19-110_e21447ad-d98a-451f-8ef0ba42209018e6.pdf.
12
Ibid.,4.
13
Duménil, Glick, and Levy, “The History of Competition Policy as Economic History.”383.
14
Sawyer, “US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective.” 4.
15
Ibid.,4.
11
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the economy, it was evident in the purposefully ambiguous legislative language that it did
not want to harm the corporations too directly, this can be seen in the removal of the
requirement of “free competition” and its replacement with “restraints of trade” which is
significantly harder to get charged for.16 The responses to the Sherman Act were positive
within the government, though many questioned it and viewed it as punishing the winners
of competition.
It is interesting to make a note of the technological and distributional patterns
during this era, especially given how it was a period of rapid innovation and growth in all
sectors leading to the application of goods and services like railroads, telegraphs,
telephones17 and other inventions which significantly changed the ways of life and
commerce. Duménil et al. (1997) noted that during this period, both labor productivity
and labor costs were rising (though slower compared to later years) but capital-labor ratio
rose super quickly.18 This period saw surprisingly low numbers for return on fixed assets
and capital productivity, but this is perhaps due to the instability of the macroeconomy at
the time than the state of technology.19 It can be seen that the technology did have some
impact in improving labor productivity since both labor productivity and capital-labor
ratio rose. While these patterns can help to reassert the fact that the Sherman Act was
clearly enacted at a period of notable technological change, it is evident just from the
inventions of the era that the technology from that time changed the geographical scope
of businesses within America. Advances made in transportation and communication

16

Duménil, Glick, and Levy, “The History of Competition Policy as Economic History.”386.
Sawyer, “US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective.” 26.
18
Duménil, Glick, and Levy, “The History of Competition Policy as Economic History.”375.
19
Ibid., 377.
17

10

technology opened up the possibility for much bigger companies to conduct interstate
commerce. This was a period where competition was changing and a period where it
needed to be regulated.
2.2.2 Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914)
Under President Woodrow Wilson, two important amendments were made to the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. The latter led to
the creation of its namesake organization which was set up to “prevent unfair methods of
competition,” help unfairly injured competitors and help consumers get their due
compensation and run investigations to make legislative recommendations about business
practices.20 The Federal Trade Commission was set up as sort of a regulatory institution
to govern business practices and competition as a whole. The Clayton Act was added in
to prohibit unlawful tying, mergers and acquisitions, something that the Sherman Act had
initially not addressed.21 Wilson borrowed heavily from Louis D. Brandeis (who would
go on to become a progressive antitrust supporting Supreme Court Justice) during his
campaign and spoke against the “curse of bigness” but despite his open bias, the law held
loopholes that allowed big businesses to easily bypass the laws. The anti-merger law did
not account for stocks in their analysis of asset acquisition, for instance.22 The period
preceding the passing of these two acts was that of relative stability in terms of both
economic, technological and distributional trends. However, it should be noted that the
period did see a boost in productivity and wages due to the managerial revolution from

20

Federal Trade Commission, “Federal Trade Commission Act,” accessed September 10, 2019,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act.
21
Sawyer, “US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective.” 11.
22
Duménil, Glick, and Levy, “The History of Competition Policy as Economic History.” 397.
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the earlier years.23 Labor productivity and real wage kept growing.24 There have been
different interpretations regarding the state of competition in that era, some deeming it
too aggressive while others finding it deficient.25 It appears as though a lot of the
interpretations of this era have been marred by political bias.
2.2.3. Robinson-Patman Act (1936), Celler-Kefauver Act (1950), and the Hart-ScottRodino Act (1976)
The Robinson-Patman Act notably outlawed price discrimination and predatory
pricing. This took place soon after the second New Deal right after the United States
underwent the economic shock of the Great Depression and the effects of implementation
of the first New Deal.26 There was a structural crisis related to the pattern of technological
and distributional crisis in this period. For big businesses and the sector of the economy
involved in heterogeneous industrial technology, growth, efficiency and profit came fast
while the traditional sector faltered. When the demand decreased in the onset of 1929, the
traditional sector collapsed, the traditional sector failed. This is the only period where
labor productivity and real wage and the stock of capital fell.27 Since then there has been
continuous growth in real wages, labor productivity and the stock of fixed capital. The
Celler-Kefauver Act which closed the acquisition of stocks loophole came at a period of
high productivity, wages, profits and technological growth following World War II.28 On
the other hand, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act which set guidelines for mergers came at a

23

Ibid., 392.
Ibid., 376.
25
Ibid., 392.
26
Sawyer, “US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective.”13.
27
Duménil, Glick, and Levy, “The History of Competition Policy as Economic History.”397.
28
Ibid., 405.
24
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period of unfavorable technological and distributional trends when market concentration
happened to be rising quickly.29 The economy was unstable at the time and continued to
be as it entered a recession in the early 1980s.30
Though not all the laws seem to be preceded by favorable trends in technological
and distributional patterns, it seems as though the long periods of positive technological
growth or shocks to those patterns cause enough socioeconomic disturbances in the
economy to have warranted amendments to competition laws in the past. This is by no
means a comprehensive economic analysis of the creation of antitrust laws in the United
States and this paper is not drawing any conclusive statements regarding this, but merely
observing a pattern which could indicate that an antitrust amendment to meet modern
competition and technology needs is long due.
2.2.4 European Antitrust Laws: The Beginnings (1957)
Before the formation of the European Union in 1993, the European Economic
Community was founded as a customs and trade union between six western European
countries. This occurred with the signing of the Treaty of the European Economic
Community (more commonly referred to as the Treaty of Rome) in 1957. 31 Along with
the creation of this common market came laws to ensure free and fair competition within
it. Articles 81 and 82 were created to safeguard against price fixing, collusions and cartels
and the abuse of market power by dominant firms (See Appendix 4).32 The general

29

Ibid., 410.
Ibid., 412.
31
European Union, “A Peaceful Europe – the Beginnings of Cooperation,” accessed September 10, 2019,
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1945-1959_en.
32
Anca Daniela Chirita, “A Legal Historical Review of the EU Competition Rules,” International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 63, no. ICQLU 2 (March 13, 2014), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2230429.
30

13

framework behind the laws were similar to those generated by their American
counterparts. Europe had faced a massive economic downturn in the advent of World
War II and European cooperation was fundamental to the future of Europe. However, the
rebuilding process and the economic stimulus from the Marshall Plan led to significant
economic growth, increase in capital stock and rise in productivity in the period
preceding the formation of common market and its accompanying competition laws.33
Though slight bureaucratic legal changes were made to the laws since the formation of
the European Union in the year 2000, the general ideas remained the same.34 Once again,
there were a lot of historical and political factors that factored into the creation of these
laws, but due to the limited scope of this paper, this section merely introduces these laws
and some of the relevant economic patterns that preceded their creation. When looking at
the laws in a general manner (without expert legal scrutiny), both the European and
American frameworks dealt with the same issues in terms of preserving competition and
preventing tacit practices by dominant market powers. They were created with the same
intent and yet their implementation varies so drastically today. The historical context
provided in this paper is by no means comprehensive, but it should provide sufficient
background knowledge needed to begin to understand the differences that arose in the
decades following the creation of these laws.

33

Barry Eichengreen, “‘The European Economy Since 1945,’” The New York Times, March 25, 2007,
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/books/chapters/0325-1st-eich.html.
34
Council of the European Union, “COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 01/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules
on Competition Laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty” (2002), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R0001&from=EN.Ibid.
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2.3. Theoretical Influences on the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws
The divergence that can be seen today in the application of antitrust laws across
the United States and the European Union can be identified back to the differences in
cultures, political institutions, economic circumstances and other individual qualities that
separate the two places. These unique variables gave rise to the popularity of specific
schools of economic thought that prevailed in affecting the outcomes of antitrust cases
and swaying the public opinion on the government’s role in intervening in “free market
competition.” Given that the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community was
signed in 195735, this paper will examine the decades following this event to make note of
the significant drifts in ideologies that contributed to the current system of antitrust law
enforcement in place in both the United States and the European Union today.
2.3.1 United States
For the longest time in the United States, there was a simple economic
understanding of competition –the existence of a lot of small firms equated to a more
competitive market than a market with a few large firms. It was understood that a few
firms with dominant market shares (oligopolies) or one firm with a dominant market
share (a monopoly) were bad for competition given that these firms would have an unfair
advantage that would allow them to block new entrants, fix prices and provide lower
quality goods and services without facing any consequences given their market share
leverage. This line of thought on competition based on market structure, affected how the
court’s addressed antitrust cases for the longest time until the 1970s, which saw the

35

European Commission, “EU Competition Law Rules Applicable to Antitrust Enforcement Volume I: General
Rules,” 2013, https://doi.org/10.2763/35312.
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advent and popularization of the very influential Chicago School of Thought. The ideas
coming out of Chicago School would go onto define the attitudes around antitrust laws
and its applications in courts in the United States till current times. 36
The most popular piece of writing in the Chicago School catalog of antitrust
contributions has to be Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox. This book has often been
referenced to both champion and critique the level of influence of this particular school of
thought. On one hand, it is an apt summary of some of the general ideas put forward by
the Chicago School, on the other, using this as the sole source dismisses the many other
differing contributions from economists like Benjamin Klein, George Stigler and Lester
Telser, which were just as influential in the courts.37 For example, it must be noted that
Stigler’s works on information and search costs and other ideas coming out of Chicago
regarding transaction costs point to the absence of perfect markets with perfect
information and no transaction costs.38 Thus, the idea that the entire basis of influence is
built on rational actors in perfect markets might be a mischaracterization of the nuances
of their specific influence on antitrust laws.39
All that being said, it is still important to note some of the specifics of Robert
Bork’s work given the sheer level of influence it wielded on antitrust thought. Bork was a
proponent of economic efficiency and believed that the goal of antitrust should be to
promote consumer welfare. This was in fact a primary point of argument by the entire
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school of thought. 40 He said that the primary purpose of enacting the Sherman Act was
consumer welfare which was used as a precedent in the court system for numerous
antitrust cases despite many debates surrounding the claim.41 Bork was also very
skeptical of the idea of legally charging monopolies for predatory pricing (the act of
charging below cost of production and taking up losses to get rid of competition) and
thought it was an unlikely irrational behavior that could be easily mistaken with general
price competition.42 He also did not think that predatory behavior through vertical
mergers were likely given that the supplier firms would want to engage in commerce with
more profitable firms and would simply not form ties if it was not efficient; and if they
were efficient, then they should not be punished by the law because then they would be
passing down the benefits to the consumers via lower prices.43Ultimately, his ideas
around the concept of economic efficiency assume that rational, profit-maximizing firms
should not engage in predatory behavior for too long since it will render them inefficient
and new entrants will overtake them thus limiting their ability to monopolize for very
long. It also suggests that if a monopoly were to be economically efficient, they should
not punish it for being so.
A few Chicago School ideas regarding antitrust laws are especially pertinent to
this paper and should be examined thoroughly. They regard “tying” to be an irrational act
for acquiring a second monopoly profit given the fact that a rise in the price of the tied
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product will reduce the demand for the tying product.44 They also do not view price
discrimination as an issue as they argue that it increases consumer welfare by getting
closer to the results of perfect competition.45 It is interesting how a recurring point in their
theory is that rational, profit-maximizing firms would not behave a certain way even
though in reality monopolies do behave in irrational predatory ways. This point is
heavily pushed when they are undermining the concept of predatory pricing, suggesting
that no firm would ever sell below cost to get rid of competitors, especially not in the
long-run as it would be inefficient and they would be overtaken by newer, more efficient
entrants into the markets.46 Finally, similar to Bork, other Chicago thinkers also put a
prominent focus on vertical mergers. It is deemed to be completely irrational for a firm to
vertically merge unless it is absolutely economically efficient which is simply not true.47
The Chicago School’s anti-interventionist influence on all these issues have led to the
courts being very resistant to punishing these crimes and this is seen in the case studies
discussed later in this paper.
A closer look at the ideas stemming from the Chicago School highlights the three
main characteristics they applied to antitrust, these were primarily (1) the neoclassical
price theory, (2) strict empiricism and (3) the error-cost framework.48
Richard Posner (1979) explained how the Chicago School adopted a simplistic view of
the marketplace based on price theory making assumptions about rational, profitmaximizing consumers and sellers who will react to prices in these preset ways (i.e. low
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prices, high demand, etc.)49 and how they try to implement it in their antitrust analysis as
well. While this added a level of economic structure to antitrust proceedings in the courts
that it did not have in the past, it might have also limited the courts in its ability to
examine irrational cases.50 Second, the Chicago School heavily emphasized the use of
quantitative methods in order to support and legitimize the claims that they made which
further established a more evidence based system for antitrust proceedings.51 Lastly, they
focused on making a case against false positives, arguing that the costs to consumer
welfare for punishing a non-predatory firm was a lot higher than not holding a monopoly
liable for its actions.52This narrow focus on consumer welfare based on price theory and a
push towards avoiding false positives led to the current court system in the United States
becoming this unwilling to prosecute monopolies.
Though various other schools of economic and legal thought have come up in the
United States since the Chicago School, none have gotten as much traction in the courts
as them. The Post-Chicago School, the Behavioral School and the New Brandeis of
Antitrust are all breaking grounds in critiquing the ways in which the Chicago School has
failed the American antitrust system but ultimately it is still the Chicago School of
Antitrust that carries the most influence in the United States. They have shaped how
antitrust laws are enforced in the United States for over 50 years and thus it is imperative
to understand their exact influence if it is ever to be diminished here.
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2.3.2. European Union
The European Union antitrust legislations were formed close to 70 years after the
introduction of the Sherman Act in the United States during the Treaty of Rome in
1957.53 While initially they mimicked the enforcement style of their counterparts across
the ocean, the divergence occurred in the late 70s when the United States antitrust scene
underwent its Chicago transformation.54 As the orthodox neoclassical economizations of
antitrust laws prevailed further in the United States, several schools of thought rose to
counteract and critique it, however, it was a while before they solidified into prominence,
the “Post-Chicago school” is one such school of thought. While these ideas grew to some
prominence in the stateside, they were far more influential in Europe, where antitrust held
more “social and political” concerns than merely “economical.” Over the years, the
Europeans took note of these post-Chicago developments in antitrust laws and
incorporated them into their system leading to the significant differences that can be seen
in antitrust law enforcement across the two places today.55Post-Chicago economist Jon
Baker notes that both Chicago and Post-Chicago thinkers agree that the goal of antitrust
laws should be to protect consumer welfare and increase allocative efficiency, but the
manner in which they think this should be done varies due to the disagreements they hold
regarding the nature of markets and monopolies.56 The Chicago School keeps a lot more
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faith in market forces and neoclassical assumptions of rationality as an answer to
monopolies than their Post-Chicago counterparts. This leads the thinkers of the latter
school to be a lot more skeptical of monopolies and their practices, making them much
bigger proponents of government intervention than the former group.57
One of the key ideas to have come out of the Post-Chicago circuits is their
criticism of Chicago’s lax attitude towards vertical mergers. They found that vertical
mergers were much more damaging than they were made out to be given that in most
real-life cases, rival companies are forced to raise their prices, and this leads to lower
total market supply at potentially higher prices (if they have not foreclosed already). So
the traditionalist argument of economic efficiency in vertical mergers misses the nuances
of how anticompetitive this behavior can be.58 The second key idea contests the Chicago
concept that rational market agents would never sell below cost, given that subsequent
monopoly prices would draw in new competitors into the market. The Post-Chicago
thinkers note that in actuality, this sort of predatory behavior sets a negative precedent in
the market and drives away competitors not only for a short time but intimidates future
entrants as well.59 It is interesting to see how the Post-Chicago economists factor in
human behavior into their analysis of the impacts of anti-competitive actions (not to the
same level as the Behavioral School, of course), but what was possibly their biggest
contribution was the incorporation of concepts from industrial organization and game
theory into their antitrust applications. Chicago School has time and time again purported

57

Ibid.
Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, “Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs To Achieve
Power Over,” Yale Law Journal 96, no. 2 (1986), https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol96/iss2/1/.
59
Baker, “Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views.”
58

21

that price wars were evidence against the possibility of price collusion in industries.60
However, repeated games (also known as supergames) models show that collusive
pricing techniques may be administered over a long period (with short periods of
competitive price drops to increase demand) in markets with imperfect information. The
nature of competition with monopolies can mimic such supergames where there are
incentives for rivals to continue to match the price of their competitor or suffer the
consequences. While it may seem like benign competition with price wars on the surface,
there may still be anticompetitive behavior present underneath.61
The Chicago School and Bork in particular did not believe that any firm that has
a presence in multiple markets would lower prices in one market to take out competition
in the market for another product (as an argument against tying).62 This was used to
justify the idea that conglomerates would be less hostile than single-product firms.
However, the Post-Chicago analysis found that there was plenty of evidence to suggest
that conglomerates repeatedly used predatory pricing and retaliated against each other in
different markets.63 Last, the Post-Chicago thinkers posit the idea of strategic entry
deterrence64, which unlike the concept of artificial barriers to entry also includes large
investments into scale economies as a strategic choice used to limit new entrants into the
market.65 Most firms are expected to undertake a certain level of sunk cost when entering
a new market, so they tend to enter the market when they can hope to recover these costs
60
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(likely at a profitable entry price). However, in the case of scale economies (or even
industries where scale economies are the norm), for the aspiring entrant to reach the
minimum efficient marginal cost, they would have to invest a huge sum from the start. So
while the pre-entry prices may be high, the entrant has no way of knowing whether the
post-entry prices would be as high and if they would be able to recover their costs thus
deterring their entry in the first place.66These types of deterrence may also include
strategic use of artificial barriers as well including high investments into advertisements,
brand proliferation and exclusivity contracts setting up a variety of ways in which a
monopoly can protect its dominant position in a market starting from its entry.67
As previously mentioned, the Post-Chicago incorporation of the methodological
tools from industrial organizational economics has allowed for a more in-depth analysis
into markets that price theory alone could not accomplish.68 This gave light to new ways
of sub-sectioning and measuring market concentration and led the way for narrower
market breakdowns in both Europe and the United States (though the Europeans tended
to have adopted the methodologies a lot more religiously). The European Union has also
retained a lot more from their structuralist past than the United States,69 where they view
market concentration as the primary detrimental force to be eliminated instead of
focusing on promoting consumer welfare at the cost of competition.70 Perhaps this is why
they responded more to the Post-Chicago thinkers who criticized Chicago’s “consumer
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welfare” model and contributed theories about how monopolies and their anticompetitive
behavior hurts competition and subsequently consumers. While social and consumer
impacts are obviously considered in the European Union, the crucial difference lies in
what is viewed to be consumer welfare. In both places, a free competitive marketplace
benefits consumers, but while the United States is more receptive to recognizing
consumer benefits in monopoly set ups, the European Union is a lot more attuned to the
long-term detriments to consumers in concentrated markets.
It is interesting to see how despite having similar goals, the theoretical influences
that dictated enforcement of the antitrust laws in the United States and the European
Union have caused such drastic differences in how antitrust legislations are implemented
today. The close identification of the influences and their ideas on antitrust enforcement
provide the framework to better understand the decisions that were made in the cases
discussed in the later chapters.
2.4. Conclusion
This chapter explored the history of the creation of antitrust legislation in the
United States and in Europe and then examined the divergence in their application today.
Data from the last 30 years show that profit rates and market concentration have risen
dramatically in the United States whereas it has stayed a lot more stable in Europe. 71
There is clearly a distinction in the application of antitrust laws between the legislative
bodies across the two continents. It is possible that the heavy influence of the Chicago
School and their emphasis on consumer welfare and fear of false positives72 has hindered
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the regulation of competition in the United States. On the other hand, while the European
legislators invoke consumer welfare to almost the same degree in their antitrust practice,
it is interesting how due to their more Post-Chicago influences, they often conflate it with
harm to competition, which would be considered a major flaw by their American
counterparts who err on the side of harming efficiency and welfare. The legislative bodies
in the United States also hold very optimistic views of the markets compared to their
European counterparts, often overestimating the abilities of newer entrants to grow, adapt
and displace potential monopolies whereas the Europeans tend to begin with more
restrictive assumptions which assume that monopolies will limit the market capabilities
of any new entrants to a higher degree.73Another factor that has created a significant
difference in not only the concentration of markets but also antitrust legislation across
these two continents is the presence of lobbying.74While this paper will not elaborate on
this specific phenomena, it is important to be aware that this exists in the United States
and is an important non-economic variable to take into account when examining this
variance.
It is important to contextualize the history of European and American antitrust
legislation against the economic background of competition economics and how it
distinctly changed its applications. More details in terms of laws, specific definitions and
economic tests can be found in the appendix if additional context is required by the
reader. The differences explored in this chapter are further realized in the examination of
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the case studies explored in Chapter 4 and should serve as a background for the analysis
of whether the implementation of antitrust laws need to improve for two of the most
influential global legislative bodies.
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Chapter 3:
The ECONOMICS BEHIND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
3.1. Introduction
Before tackling the concept of antitrust in information technology, it is important
to understand the economic theories behind technology and eventually information
technology as these theories will determine the degree to which the technologies
employed by these firms have an impact on their market activities and consequently their
market abuses. Technology and technological change have existed in the economic
dialogue for over centuries and their importance in affecting production at the firm level
or national level has been recognized throughout this time.75 However, it had been
isolated as an exogenous variable in most major schools of thought and this limited a
greater exploration into the causes and effects of technology beyond productivity
changes. The first section in this chapter will briefly explore the neoclassical ways of
analyzing technology and then contrast it with Joseph Schumpeter’s more dynamic take,
given the relevant insight it provides into the correlation between technology and
competition and also due to its foundational impact on the understanding of information
technology today.
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As a rapidly changing current technology, information technology has not only
branched off into a whole new set of subsidiary technologies but also faces unique
economic conditions which affect their market behavior. It is thus imperative, to
contextualize the greater understanding of the economics of technology and technological
change with the added elements from information technology to understand exactly how
information technology firms can affect competition and innovation. The last half of this
chapter elaborates on the complexities of regulating competition in the information
technology industry but also why it makes it that much more important to do so. Any
antitrust analysis into the information technology industry needs to be sensitive to these
industry-specific issues as it fundamentally changes how competition in this industry is
needs to be analyzed.
3.2. Theories on Technology and Technological Change
One of the earliest notions of technology seen in economic theory is in Adam
Smith’s writing where an increase of efficiency and productivity is seen through the
division of labor and using learning by doing.76 While the importance of technology has
always been acknowledged by mainstream Neoclassical economists as a vital part of
economic growth and productivity, it was always cornered away as a rigid exogenous
variable that existed within the already static Neoclassical equilibrium framework.77
Though prominent writers like Marx and Schumpeter did emphasize the role of
technology in the past, until the last half of the century, most economists boxed
technology into limited roles within their models. Many economists opted for the model
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where technology is simply an external, abstract, given variable in a production function
which affects the degree of economies of scale or the rate at which the inputs generate the
outputs.78 While these firm theories focused on technology and what it could accomplish
for productivity, it thoroughly lacked in its ability to explain what encompassed the
machinations of this technology and technological change.
However, a few other economists tried to take on a deeper view of technology,
viewing it as having a more transformative role in the production process than merely
being an efficiency driver. These theories build on the idea of distinct and uneven
technological knowledge and explore how there are unique costs and gains associated
with applications of different technologies.79 While many theories around technology
have come up in today’s modern world (and continue to do so every day), to preserve the
focus of this paper, this section will briefly explore the historically limited perspectives
on technology and technological change held in Neoclassical economics, the more
nuanced views on technology held by Joseph Schumpeter and how they ultimately
influenced a lot of the modern in-depth analysis on technology today. This section should
serve as a theoretical backdrop to understanding and hopefully building ideas on the
specific niche that is information technology.
3.2.1 Technological Change within The Neoclassical Black box
Nathan Rosenberg famously and aptly surmised that “Economists have long
treated technological phenomena as events transpiring inside a black box” and that “The
economics profession has adhered rather strictly to a self-imposed ordinance not to
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inquire too seriously into what transpires inside that box.”80 As discussed previously, for
the longest time, early neoclassical frameworks valued the role of technology and
technological change but only as an exogenous factor that led to greater productivity and
increase in (possibly better quality) outputs.81 It did not delve into the causes behind
technological change, treated it like a residual and failed to isolate the effects of
technological change on the output compared to the other factors of productions and
causes. A lot of the earlier studies were also only preoccupied with technology as a costsaving measure in production processes and did not explore the multitudes of ways in
which technology is used to improve upon the quality and type of goods (and not just the
quantity produced).82
Though technological change has been studied in the context of production
functions in the aggregate economy (notably by Robert Solow), some of the key findings
about the neoclassical understanding of technology and technological change comes from
their work on firm theory.83 Production functions are combinations of various input
factors in the market (i.e. land, labor, capital) which along with preset technological
factors can create a certain number of outputs. Aside from the factors of production,
everything else (including technology) in the neoclassical framework is held as a
constant. All factors are utilized to accomplish the profit maximizing equilibrium for the
firm, as firms are rational, profit-maximizing entities in the neoclassical framework.
Technological change only occurs to either create a new product (product innovation) or
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improve upon the production function (process innovation)84 of the existing one. This
diminishes technology and technological change to its consequences of reducing costs
and increasing profits and implies that it exists in vacuum only to lend its abilities for that
cause.85 This does very little to answer what causes technological change and largely
ignores the relationships that exist between technological change and the other factors of
production (such as capital accumulation and investment having a direct effect on
technological change or how particular technological improvements affect capital and
labor productivity differently).86The theory of the firm also rarely considered the vital
decision-making role of entrepreneurship in creating technological change, which along
with the fact that it proposed highly unproductive firms (firms with high average costs
and small outputs in perfect competition) was just the least of its flaws.87
As for the cause of technological change, the baseline assumption seemed to be
that inventions and the direction of technological change remained outside of the firm’s
decision-making scope, therefore it is something that only occurred exogenously and was
applied to the firm’s production processes only when it became feasible to do so. These
assumptions were not true as Jacob Schmookler demonstrated through historical data that
not only did technological change have economic consequences, but they also had
economic causes behind them.88 He specifically found that more resources are allocated
to inventions for industries that have higher market demand which means that
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technological change does not in fact exist in economic isolation as neoclassical models
would suggest, but is in reality deeply affected by the ever-changing market machinations
like every other economic variable. Technological change is not just a mere outcome of
external inventive processes but are connected to the same entrepreneurial impulses that
dictate every other production decision.
The neoclassical framework relies heavily on a static equilibrium framework with
a lot of rigid assumptions about rationality and constants. Oftentimes, the idea of profitmaximizing firms utilizing the best possible technology implies that there is a steady
store of technology that they can all access at will (and that they will do so). This baseline
modelling assumption is clearly not true and ultimately this deterministic view on
technology has limited the ability for this framework to examine the origin of
technological change with the depth that it needs. Technological change is a dynamic
economic process and given its immense impact on economic outcomes, it is extremely
important to understand how it is generated and diffused within the greater economic
context rather than confining it within the black box.
3.2.2 Schumpeterian Thought on Technology
Joseph Schumpeter rejected the rigid static nature of Walrasian equilibrium
models and instead argued that capitalism was inherently dynamic and was always on the
verge of disequilibrium.89 He believed that these divergences from equilibrium were not
only externally prompted but were also specifically a result of changes within the system.
Schumpeter did not accept the idea of one steady state equilibria to the next and instead
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argued that innovation was the endogenous driving force behind economic change in
capitalist economies and that the stationary nature of perfect equilibrium and perfect
competition failed to capture the dynamic nature of innovation and its essential role in the
economy.90 Innovation is oftentimes referred to as the process of developing new
technologies, but Schumpeter specifically defined it as “new combinations of existing or
knowledge, resources, equipment or other factors.”91 In recognizing the limitations of the
general equilibrium model and neoclassical assumptions, his ideas offer one of the first
dynamic views on technology and technological change. Schumpeter’s two seminal
theories in regards to capitalism and innovation are referred to as Mark I and Mark II and
deal with entrepreneurs and institutions respectively. The ideas he developed are
fundamental to our understanding of the dynamic evolutionary process that is innovation
and its mechanisms, and also helped to develop the theories around technological change
today.
Schumpeter thought that models that used perfect competition and perfect
equilibrium assumptions were too stable to incorporate the disruptive force that was
innovation and that if firms acted as price-takers there would be no room for long-run
profits (which he believed to be an incentivizing force for innovative activities). For
Schumpeter, profits were not a negative sign, but rewards and incentives for innovation
which in his theory cannot exist under perfect competition where there are zero profits
and no incentives to improve the production process.92 Schumpeter believed that
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technological competition drove the rise in profit margins and would thus further
incentivize companies to keep innovating to reach monopoly profits. He estimated an
equitable overall result as the fierce technological competition would eventually
eliminate monopoly profits for one firm as other firms would take over (either new firms
or more efficient imitators) and the economy would be in a constant state of “creative
destruction.”93 The continuous innovation needed to generate profits will constantly be
creating new market powers and will be destroying old market powers, and he believed
that this process of creative destruction best reflected the dynamic nature of economic
development in a capitalist environment.94
Schumpeter emphasized the role of entrepreneurs in his earlier works regarding
technological change, where they were central to the process of creative destruction.
Entrepreneurs were described as risk-taking individuals who planned, managed and
organized innovative activities. They were social deviants who were willing to make
investments into radical ideas, and had the ability to turn them profitable. For Schumpeter
who was influenced by Marx, entrepreneurs were the dynamic force behind innovation
and were people who were driven to innovate with the hope of gaining entrepreneurial
gross profits.95 It should be clarified before proceeding further that though Schumpeter
posits monopoly profits as being an important driver for innovation and notes that perfect
competition is not conducive to incentivizing innovation, he does emphasize the role of
creative destruction (which is reliant on technological competition). So while monopolies
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do form as temporary passing phases in Schumpeter’s capitalist model, they are also
meant to be destroyed just as quickly by their technological rivals (rather than just price
competition rivals).96 Schumpeter made a note of how innovation in the same field
occurred in clusters and would come in waves (i.e. combinatorial innovation), and he
attributed it to demand-side forces influencing entrepreneurs to innovate more in that
direction. This further tied together the role of innovation within the greater market
forces.97
Schumpeter also emphasized the importance of stable institutions that are
conducive to innovation in order to allow for creative destruction. He spoke regarding the
roles of both formal (i.e. governments, policies, regulations, legal frameworks and more)
and informal institutions (i.e. norms, customs, culture and more). Entrepreneurs were
people who were expected to face resistance from the structures of their institutions but
were willing to break free and still innovate. 98 It is interesting how one of the key
defining features for Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs are that they are not “rational” and are
unpredictable “rule-breakers” which is what makes them the perfect driving forces
behind the dynamic innovative processes. However, in Schumpeter’s future writings it
seemed like he feared that capitalism would self-destruct as “rational” large firms and
institutions would replace these entrepreneurs and technological change would become
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predictable and automatized.99 While the fall of capitalism is most likely a long time
away, what can be understood from Schumpeter is that entrepreneurs are important
driving forces behind innovation and that they need to exist within flexible institutions
that need to allow them to thrive.
Schumpeter was one of the earliest figures to take a look at technological change
as a driving force behind capitalist economies rather than viewing it as a byproduct of
economic production. He critiqued neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition,
perfect equilibrium and perfect knowledge, and in doing so he developed an economic
model that captured the dynamic nature of technological competition. This helped him to
better understand and identify the causes and origins behind technological change and
innovation. Schumpeter’s way of looking at capitalism not only revolutionized the way
economists thought about technological change but also the static nature of how
economic models were analyzed.
3.3. Theoretical Developments in the Age of Information Technology
Every little advance within information technology is considered a radical
innovation and has widespread market impact. Information technology belongs to a
unique subset of general purpose technology that has its own interdependent
complementary ecosystem that tends to allow for both upstream and downstream process
innovations and new product innovations.100 Information technology employs a highskilled-labor and capital-intensive form of production, which is not uncommon but it has
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also been noted to be unskilled labor-saving but maintenance intensive.101 Some
industries that utilize information technology are often expected to invest heavily from
the beginning but can expect low marginal costs later, they thrive on economies of scale
and have to rely heavily on network externalities or network effects. Information
technology firms are innovative enterprises that should have to rely on the constant
development and utilization of productive resources (i.e. innovation) to gain large market
shares and economies of scale.102
While most of the theories that apply to any other technology can be applied to
information technology in economic analyses (notably economics of generation and
diffusion of innovation), due to its wide array of different products and immense
influence over the global markets, there are some particular characteristics that become
more prominent for information technology firms. It is thus of utmost importance, that
any economic research pertaining to information technology firms be sensitive to the
specific predicaments of this industry. This section will explore some of the economic
theory regarding technological change that are heavily applicable in the study of
information technology and will also explore some of the economic concepts that
highlight the unique characteristics of this industry that are relevant to the case studies
discussed later in this paper.
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3.3.1. The Unique Economics of Information Technology
Information technology firms are supposed to be the bastions of innovation in
today’s world. Given that firms in this industry should be reliant on constant innovation
for holding their places in the market, it is important to begin this discussion with some
of the unique challenges these firms face due to the collective, cumulative and uncertain
nature of innovation.103The innovative process is filled with uncertainties, but firms
constantly face technological uncertainties in that they could make investments into
certain technologies and it could fail. They also face market uncertainties where even if
their technology is successfully built, it could fail to accomplish economies of scale.
Lastly, they face competitive uncertainties, where even upon accomplishing economies of
scale, their competitor could have built a better product and be outselling them at a lower
price.104 This is why most firms in this industry and even the monopolies that form spend
most of their time trying to guard against these specific uncertainties by employing
various market practices discussed later in this section.
It should be mentioned again that information technology has a very specific cost
structure, where there are large upfront fixed costs with sometimes negligible to zero
marginal costs of production. This cost structure is similar to that of natural monopolies
and oftentimes information technology monopolies are defended on that basis, ignoring
the fact that various other investments other than innovation and high upfront capital
costs (such as lobbying, marketing, perfecting entry timing and price discrimination)
have been utilized to maintain that potentially inefficient monopoly power. 105
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Information technology firms can also benefit from increasing returns due to supply-side
economies of scale because of their low marginal costs (long-run average cost goes
down), but they can also benefit from demand-side economies of scale due to network
effects. Overall, firms in this industry are highly incentivized to operate at economies of
scale and lock-in as many users as they can as fast as possible because of this. This could
be seen in how Amazon was not profitable for almost 15 years, but chose to keep low
prices just to build up their scale and drive away competitors. Now they can reap the
benefit from their low marginal costs and huge user base without the threat of any rival
being able to invest as much into the market anytime soon.106 Information technology
firms take advantage of and sometimes misuse certain economic effects that are amplified
due to the specific nature of their technology. These are discussed in-depth below.
3.3.1. (a) Network Effects and Increasing Returns
Information technology belongs to a network industry and are thus privy to both
direct and indirect network effects. Network effects is the idea that agents gain additional
value from adopting a technology that already has more users, and in turn the technology
gains more value with the addition of the agent.107 This is sometimes referred to as
demand-side economies of scale since this increases the average revenue as the scale
increases.108 Network effects were previously seen in technologies such as telephones or
the fax system, where the value of the product increased significantly as more users
adopted the technology. Though, network effects have been seen in the past before, the
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combination of network effects along with increasing returns amplify a lot of conditions
for firms in this industry, most notably their incentives to price discriminate and lock-in
users.109
Given that most firms have high fixed costs and low marginal costs, and that
network effects are present, they have the incentive to reach economies of scale as soon
as possible to benefit from increasing returns to scale. Sometimes firms will utilize
predatory pricing to corner in a large share of the market to maximize the benefit from
network effects (and subsequently benefit from supply-side economies of scale). Once
the users are locked-in to the network, it might be really expensive for the user to leave
said network, as they might have to switch a lot of complementary infrastructure related
to the product. This might make it impossible for an entrant with a competing technology
to acquire enough users to ever benefit from network effects as the switching costs are
too high. Acknowledging that information technology operates at an increasing returns
model, allows one to note how unpredictable the market outcomes could be. A more
inferior product can be the dominant product merely based on timing of entry.110 These
types of inefficiencies only occur in increasing returns models because in the constant
returns model, the previous number of adoptions of a technology would not affect the
returns to adoptions, the agent will simply choose their preferred technology.111 Under
diminishing returns, the agent will only use the technology that is superior since there is a
higher opportunity cost to utilizing technology.112 It is important to take into

109

Ibid., 37.
W. Brian Arthur, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events,” The Economic
Journal 99, no. 394 (March 1989): 116, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234208.
111
Ibid., 122.
112
Ibid., 122.
110

40

consideration these factors about the information technology industry to better understand
how the firms and consumers will behave in the market.
3.3.1. (b) First Mover Advantages & Spillover Effects
It is important to consider not just the innovation itself but the time at which the
technology is adopted by a firm in the market. There are certain advantages and
disadvantages associated with being a “first mover.” First movers tend to incur most of
the development costs of the new technology while bearing most of the risks regarding its
future profitability. However, the first mover can stay ahead of their rivals due to
capturing the market early on, developing brand recognition and benefiting from network
effects which might make the switching costs for their consumers really high.113 These
advantages could ultimately still be temporary if they do not keep developing their
technology or find a way to deter competition.
Almost all technology will undergo diffusion, where it is adopted by others and
sometimes even improved (i.e. innovated) upon. Though certain technologies diffuse a lot
faster than others, sometimes firms can take measures to inhibit the process through
proliferous misuse of intellectual property laws and by setting up other standardization
barriers (where they limit the complementary technologies that can be used with their
technologies).114 When it comes to the information technology industry, it has been
shown in numerous studies how most of their technologies tend to have large spillover
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effects, even if they are delayed sometimes.115 When there are positive spillover effects at
both the inter-industry and intra-industry level116firms often become very careful about
early adopters who might become more profitable faster as they did not have to incur any
of the early development costs.117 Early adopters are also more likely to make the
technology more efficient as they utilize learning-by-doing.118 Firms have to heavily
consider whether their first mover advantage (if they are able to build wide network
effects early on) outweigh the losses they might incur from potential spillover effects.
These effects are very prominently seen in the information technology industry
where many of the largest monopolies today were not pioneers in their fields but were
early followers who benefited heavily from adopting and improving upon the technology
that was the result of large investments by other firms or even governments. Most
notably, the iPhone by Apple Inc., one of the highest selling phones in the world,
incorporated technologies such as multitouch screens, global positioning systems (GPS)
and other cellular and internet technologies that had been developed by other companies
through heavy subsidization by the government or were direct results of government
research and development projects.119 Apple is not the only beneficiary of such
technologies, Microsoft, Google, Amazon and many others have benefited from others’
investments into various technologies. However, it is unfortunate that most of these
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companies often file hundreds of patents a year on minor technicalities just to limit the
spillover effects that they themselves benefitted so greatly from.
3.3.1. (c) Price Discrimination and Bundling
The high fixed costs and low marginal costs, and sometimes the disproportionate
market power that comes with it means that firms in this industry have high incentives for
price discrimination. Though it is understandable that firms would want to recoup their
initial investment, oftentimes consumer surplus is disproportionately lower compared to
the exorbitant producer surpluses. They are further able to maximize their profits due to
the unique position they have as information technology firms to not only collect
monetary compensation for their products but also highly detailed user data, which has
been used to design various degrees of price discrimination plans120 Amazon has in the
past conducted first-degree price discrimination when they charged different prices for
the same good to different consumers based on their past purchase activities.121 These sort
of discriminatory behavior allows for firms to target consumers’ reservation prices and
allows them to extract greater surpluses.122
While one could argue that second-degree price discrimination (where cheaper,
lower functionality alternatives are available to those who are willing to pay less e.g.
Windows 10 Home, Pro, etc.) and third-degree price discrimination (where segments of
population are targeted based on certain attributes (e.g. student discounts, veteran
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discounts, etc.) have been used in other industries as well and that more access to
information technology is an overall gain for society, the cost at which this comes should
also be weighed thoroughly.123 While market research has helped firms in the past build
price discrimination plans, the sheer scale and accuracy of data that most information
technology firms have today is not comparable. Consumers are more vulnerable to
exploitation than ever before and this becomes especially problematic in light of the fact
that most information technology firms tend to monetize user data for advertising or
third-party sales purposes as well. So, it should be clarified, that price discrimination in
itself is not a harmful activity all the time, but the scale at which it is being conducted, the
means through which it is conducted, and the consequences of it are being pointed as the
issues in this industry.
Similarly, another discriminatory pricing practice that has larger effects within the
information technology industry is bundling. Bundling is the process of tying one good to
the sale of another. While it may sound counterintuitive for profit margins, it is actually
very beneficial for firms under certain circumstances. Bundling tends disperse a
consumer’s willingness to pay whereby the firm can take advantage of the consumer’s
willingness to pay for the tying product to make them pay for the slightly higher price of
the bundle as a whole.124 Bundles allow for firms to offload unpopular products and
recoup the cost for the production and at other times they allow for the sale of two
complementary goods, allowing the firms to become more competitive in the market for
the tied products. Bundling raises the profit in most cases, but in information technology
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industries, this is even more evident due to the low marginal costs. However, information
technology firms use bundling very strategically as means to enter new markets, lock-in
new customers into their ecosystem and to further increase the costs that the consumers
might face if they try to switch products.125 These are some of the specific elements
pertinent to information technology industries that exacerbate the impact of certain
market abuses.
3.3.2. Big Tech: The Convoluted Economics Behind Rapidly Changing Products
While the previous section provided some insight into some of the economic ideas
around information technology, this section will dive into the complicacies that have
arisen in recent times when it comes to applying certain economic theories to firms
specifically in what is being termed as the “tech” sector of the information technology
industry. This section will primarily explore the complex nature of some of the “Big
Tech” monopoly firms based on specific examples relevant to the case studies explored
later on and how traditional economic ideas can be limited at times in capturing the
intricate realities of this technology.
3.3.2. (a) The Data Economy
Information technology industries are not unique in requiring the collection of
copious amounts of data but where they stand out is their ability to process it at an
unforeseen speed. Legislators foresaw the need for data protection acts with the advent of
these industries, however, the technology accelerated at a much faster rate than any
legislative body could keep up, so some gap in oversight was to be expected. What was
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unexpected, however, was the sheer scale of economization of data and how quickly it
would go on to change integral facets of this industry and beyond. It should be noted that
this is not just a “tech” issue, information technology has facilitated mass data collection
inside of other sectors as well, most notably the financial sector. If data were to be
incorporated within antitrust analyses, it would have far wider impact beyond information
technology industries.
Data is used in the input that designs the technology and to personalize the output
that consumers buy, and it can also serve as a commodity to be sold to advertisers for
revenue.126Large datasets (often termed as “Big Data” as a gimmick) have endless
potential for commercialization not only as means to improve a technology but also
simply as something to be sold en masse.127 The values of datasets increase with the
increase in their size and thus companies that benefit heavily from network effects are
more likely to also have more valuable data assets than smaller companies.128 This opens
up another facet where a firm may benefit from economies of scale and maybe
incentivized to accomplish it through predatory means (which a large cumulation of data
makes easier, as explained in the previous section). There is evidence in the intrinsic
value of data and its ability to gain more market power as firms have been seen
attempting to acquire other firms just to acquire their users (and data).129
A common argument made against the misuse of data is that it is a non-rival good
and that one firm acquiring a certain data point does not diminish another firm’s ability to
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acquire and utilize it.130 For the purposes of their example, they acknowledge the time
constraints on a user’s ability to be on different websites at a time and it potentially
hindering data collection ability for a competitor, but they make the argument that any
superior website should be able to draw in users and collect data for themselves (even if it
has been collected before).131 This fails to recognize that most information technology
firms operate on an increasing returns model and that users are unlikely to use a newer
website regardless of quality when there is already a more “established” website with
more users. So, data being non-rival is a moot point when it is subject to the same
network effects that normal sales are. Another argument against data’s value as an asset
is its short shelf life.132 A lot of the times the arguments against the incorporation of data
in antitrust analysis focus on terminology rather than its effect. Though there is no
denying that data has temporary value as an asset, if only a few firms are able to collect
data continuously due to their size, then new entrants are further disadvantaged as they
will never gain enough users to have their datasets be valuable (and the value will erode
quickly if the same users not return). Data is a very tricky unit to incorporate into
economic analyses, but it seems evident that it has economic value and immense effect
on technological competition.
A lot of technology products are often sold at little to no cost to users which
makes price analysis of their anticompetitive behavior extremely difficult. Some of the
arguments for the integration of data into antitrust analysis focuses heavily on the value
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of consumer privacy as a dimension for market power133 or the role of data as tangible
economic assets, but while both have merits in acknowledging the ever growing
dominance of data within markets, both tend to take on very narrow and limiting
definitions which makes it open to pedantic attacks about the nature of data and how it is
used rather than how it is used at a certain scale. There are ways in which literature on
increasing returns and network effects can offer ideas on how to address issues with data
and its effects on competition, but there are so many more elements of commercialization
of data, much beyond the scope of this paper, that requires economic analysis to better
understand the nature of competition today.
3.3.2 (b) Endless Vertical Integration
Vertical integration is the process of merging a “distributor” of a product with the
“supplier” whereby both firms benefit via the reduction of transaction costs and have the
ability to provide goods at a lower cost (due to no markup from supplier) and become
more competitive as a result. As previously discussed in Chapter 2 (pg. 15), the Chicago
School thinkers found nothing particularly harmful about this. They argued that as long
as it brought about economic efficiency and passed on benefits to the consumers (in the
form of low prices), it should be fine to let it continue.134 The repercussion for
competition was completely ignored, especially the fact that this would limit the number
of suppliers available for their rivals and would ultimately force their rivals to raise their
prices and potentially exit the market.135 While vertical integration can be efficient, it
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needs to be evaluated fairly against its anticompetitive effects as well, which the PostChicago thinkers made an effort to recognize.
The problem, however, arises when vertical integration becomes more complex,
making it harder to evaluate the extent of the anticompetitive nature of certain
integrations. Apple has been one of the biggest companies to incorporate vertical
integration in terms of their flagship software and hardware, namely the iOS (mobile
operating system) and the macOS (computer operating system) for their phone, tablet and
laptop devices.136 They avoided scrutiny for the vertical integration of iOS and iPhones in
the European Commission even though Google faced charges for setting limitations
regarding the devices that their Google Android mobile operating systems can be used
in.137 The European Commission made the distinction that Google Android was a
licensable mobile operating system whereas the Apple iOS was a proprietary mobile
operating system made solely for use on the iPhone, which affected their decision
(discussed more in Chapter 4, pg. 78). This is still a relatively simple distinction that can
be made due to the evident nature of components of the vertical integration, it starts to get
more complicated further down the line.
Within the Google Android mobile operating system (for the purposes of this
example, within a Google device), there are countless applications that users need to use
to utilize the full functionality of their phone. Some primary functional applications that
allow calling, messaging, calendars and others are preloaded onto the phone like most
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phones, but other applications are downloaded from the Google Playstore. Google
Playstore is the Google Android mobile operating system’s mobile application store
where other developers and Google’s own developers produce applications for all phones
operating on Google Android. Some of the applications are up for purchase and most
tend to collect data or show advertisement (essentially, there is a financial incentive for
getting applications downloaded). Some of these applications have further purchase
options inside of them. This is where it starts to get a little more convoluted. Should the
Google Playstore be counted as another “retailer” within the Google Android mobile
ecosystem? Does Google have an unfair advantage within this system given the fact that
they are then second stage vertical integrators? Can they abuse their market dominance at
the previous market level especially when their store of data on consumers and rivals are
taken into account? Should the applications themselves be considered another stage of
integration given that small bundle offers are marketed on those miniscule monopolies?
To give an example, Google Drive is an application within the Google Playstore which
exists in the Google Android mobile operating system in Google Phones, but they also
sell storage upgrades at specific monthly rates within the Google servers. Amazon and
Microsoft both sell similar storage spaces on their own platforms, so they could argue
that they are competing with each other under rates for application-based storage services
rather than being uncompetitive within one application. However, a counter-argument
can be made that someone using Google Drive is already so invested into the Google
application ecosystem that they might face high switching costs for using anything else,
so they might be trapped into the set of prices Google sets for storage inside of the
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application without the option of having to purchase additional storage from competitors
for their files.
One could define the relevant markets to evaluate anticompetitive behavior based
on the extent of harm done to consumer welfare, but it ultimately seems like one has to
rely on subjective judgement. Though economic theory has noted anticompetitive effects
of vertical integration across different markets,138 for the most part it seems like it did not
foresee a future where markets would scale down to such miniscule factions and explore
the potential negative repercussions of that. Hopefully, as time passes legislative
institutions will become more sensitive to these details and will recognize the extent of
control that some of these conglomerates have.
3.4. The Importance of Regulating Competition in Big Tech
“Big Tech” notably refers to a few large companies within the tech sector which
belong within the greater information technology industry. Though over the last 40 years,
countless tech companies have entered and exited the market, a couple of names continue
to dominate the markets despite the ebbs and flows. It is an umbrella term for a few firms
who seem to each specialize in a few distinct technologies, but share similar economic
characteristics in the greater tech sphere. Apple, Samsung, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google’s
parent company), Intel and Facebook are a few such companies.139 Most of these firms
have the dominant market shares in a lot of the markets that they are participating in; they
are also vertically and horizontally integrated across various markets, and their specific
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technology encourages them to pursue economies of scale over profit-margins even if it
means utilizing unique anticompetitive methods (which their technology conglomerates
can facilitate).140
As discussed earlier, the common consensus within the United States (which has
immense global influence), tends to lean on the side of these companies. There is
obviously the “American rhetoric” of not wanting to punish the winners of competition,
which added with the heavy influence of Chicago School and their “consumer welfare”
argument led to a dilution of anti-monopoly arguments in the stateside. Though the
Europeans maintained a stronger stance against monopolies, they still showed legislative
hesitation thinking about the potential impact of regulations on innovative activity.141
Though there is no doubt that these are important considerations that any government
institution should be debating before enforcing any antitrust legislation, it is also
becoming imminent that they do this soon given the rate at which these companies are
growing not just in size but also in global influence. Both Chicago School with its strict
ideas around competition and general neoclassical thought around technology fail to
encapsulate the nature of these big technology monopolies. To fully realize the extent of
exploitation and harm that these companies are capable of undertaking, one must take on
a more nuanced look at the technology to recognize how at a certain scale they are made
prime for predatory behavior.
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A lot of the proponents against regulations in technology will ironically default to
Schumpeter and his idea of monopoly profits as incentives for innovation; arguing that
regulations would inhibit innovation.142 They argue against the social costs of breaking
down these companies, justify their behavior based on their contribution to the economy
and suggest that their continued research and development investments and patents are
proof of the existence of competition.143 It seems as though these specific critics of
increased antitrust legislation hope to take on a more dynamic look at technology as
Schumpeter did and argue that Microsoft and Google are merely temporary monopoly
profit winners who will be replaced by the next best technology to come.144 This idea of
technological competition that Schumpeter proposes, while much more dynamic than its
earlier neoclassical counterparts, simply does not exist in its perfect form any more than
perfect price competition exists in the real world. In the real world, these technology
giants exist across multiple platforms and they benefit from an unparalleled scale that no
new entrant can compete with, and while certain individual products of theirs will fail
from time to time, they have the ability (both technologically and economically) to
sustain themselves much longer than any new entrant in any potential market. Tech
monopolies also spend a large portion of their profits in predatory value extraction
through stock buy backs instead of innovative practices.145 It has been made apparent time
and time again that it is the government and not these tech monopolies that are the
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biggest spenders in initial radical innovative activities, so it is a weak argument to
suggest that monopolies should be protected for their contributions to research and
development given how little they prioritize it.146
A lot of the times, Nokia, Kodak, Myspace and other companies are shown as
examples of the creative destruction process.147 What this always fails to account for is
that none of these companies reached the level of horizontal and vertical integration
across multiple markets as today’s tech monopolies, especially not with the same level of
global market dominance. They were also hit with a lot of the pitfalls of being first
movers or having their technologies become obsolete. Schumpeter is right about the fact
that firms will keep innovating to pursue monopoly profits, which explains why firms
like Google, Amazon, Facebook and others continue to invest into research and
development. However, they maintain their monopoly power through a variety of factors
other than innovation which is why leaving it to market forces to break apart monopolies
might not lead to desirable results. These can range from predatory pricing, tying of
products to the setting up of artificial barriers and others that have been discussed in
details in the previous sections. All of these have behavior have anticompetitive effects
and these firms are in uniquely large positions to have an even bigger negative
repercussion on the market as a whole.
The “Big Tech” firms tend to prioritize their scale over their short-run profit
margin, which often means they are incentivized to conduct themselves in manners that
prioritize growing in size and becoming a monopoly rather than focus on the competitive
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outcome, be it price or technology. This not only hinders the entrance of new and better
technology into the markets, but also makes consumers vulnerable to exploitation by a
few limited firms. While there is a level of benefit that consumers derive from these
firms, their size and influence can become problematic as it broaches into social and
political spheres. Though it would be naive to assume that a real world model for perfect
competition can exist, legislative institutions can at least strive to prevent consumers
from being exploited by monopolies and ensure that there is an environment for healthy
levels of competition to thrive in the technological sector.
3.5. Conclusion
As outlined in this chapter, information technology firms operate under unique
conditions which not only differentiate their incentives as firms but also how they operate
once they achieve monopoly status. Information technology firms require high initial
investments and see high fixed costs but negligible marginal costs. The combination of
increasing returns with economies of scale added with the race to achieve network effects
mean that oftentimes, these firms aim to incentivize growing a user base before growing
profits, so their anticompetitive behavior often pertains to preventing other firms from
gaining users. Innovation is not always the determinant of who holds the dominant
position in the market, but a variety of factors in regards to who moved first, intellectual
property rights, the degree of spillovers can also affect this. There is also the fact that the
technology itself facilitates price discrimination, tying and other tacit behavior often
concealed under efficient coding.
While the general themes are similar to previously known economic concepts
present individually in other industries, it is evident that these conditions are exacerbated
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within the information technology industry to the point where antitrust analyses are
missing acts of abuses by monopolies here due to the failure to incorporate the nuances in
their technology. It gets even more complex when it comes to topics where the literature
is not as developed yet, such as the economic value of data or the presence of multilevel
markets within technologies which have immense implications for antitrust analysis.
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Chapter 4:
CASE STUDIES
4.1. Introduction
After the in-depth look at how antitrust laws are implemented in two of the
world’s leading legislative bodies (at least those with the ability to enact most global
impact on competition for now) and how information technology firms are uniquely
positioned when it comes to antitrust analysis, it is vital to evaluate this information
against case studies in this field. For the purposes of this paper, two of the most important
cases across both continents pertaining to two of the biggest monopolies in this industry
have been chosen as a part of this evaluation, namely the Microsoft case of the 1980s in
the United States and the Google case of the 2010s in the European Union. While the
chapter does briefly explore equivalent cases (if there are any) in the United States and
European Union for the two monopolies to pinpoint the contrast, it however focuses
primarily on the landmark cases as the basis for exploring how information technology
has evolved in the last 30 years, how antitrust analysis has evolved in this time frame and
if and what considerations they need to consider for future evaluations in this industry.
Microsoft and Google were chosen for this case study due to the level of market
dominance they held at the time of the antitrust allegations brought against them, the
similar manners in which they exhibited the incentives for conducting information
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technology facilitated abuses and lastly, the ways in which both legislative bodies missed
their abuses due to a greater lack of understanding of the nature of this technology. The
case studies in this chapter will elaborate on the technical details of the antitrust
allegations which will help to contextualize the issues explored in the previous chapter.
Due to the limited paperwork available for some of the European Commission case files
for Google at the time of writing this paper, this case study chose not to contrast the
specific economic tests used in the antitrust analysis, focusing instead on the technologyspecific details of the analysis which is more imperative to the analysis presented in the
next chapter. Despite the 30 years between the two cases and rapid change of technology
in between, there have been similar trends displayed in both cases which allow a
relatively conclusive argument to be drawn in regards to the implementation of antitrust
legislation in this industry and also allows one to infer what antitrust bodies should be
considerate of in its future analyses of this industry.
4.2. Microsoft Case Details
Though not the first of its kind, the Microsoft case was one of the most defining
antitrust cases in the technology industry, partly because of the notoriety of its founder
Bill Gates but mostly due to the sheer scale at which it was monopolizing the industry.
When the case was brought forth to the courts in 1998, it forced the lawmakers and
economists at the time to reevaluate the manners in which they evaluated product markets
and the products themselves. It highlighted the inadequacies and the limitations of the
current set of antitrust laws and the measures of market concentration and set the stage
for antitrust cases in the technology sector for the future. The case also led to widespread
public debate about monopolies, government regulations and whether it was hindering
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progress and innovation. Thus, it is of utmost importance to examine the details of this
case –an antitrust case set right at the beginning of the mass global consumption of tech
products, which necessitated antitrust laws to evolve and led to a greater societal
examination into how influential monopolies in this sector could affect the rapidly
globalizing world. This case has been the center of scholarly debates long since it took
place almost 30 years ago, yet conversations still continue regarding the many merits and
demerits of the case and how it shaped the environment for antitrust cases today. In this
section, the specific details of the infamous 1998 Microsoft case will be discussed. This
will then be further analyzed in the economic context for the next chapter.
4.2.1. Setting
In the mid-1970s, personal computers had not taken its place in American and
global households the same way that it would merely a decade later. This is in part due to
the costs but mostly it was because of the level of expertise needed to operate a computer
operating system (requiring clunky text-based commands to operate and perform tasks
on).148 Simply put, the operating system of a computer is the software that manages and
connects the hardware of the computer and all the other software applications that are run
on it149. It is the most integral software for computers and in the 1980s, this was mostly a
text-based command-driven setup and Microsoft’s MS-DOS was the industry standard.
Though not the only ones in the industry (notably Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak’s
Macintosh), Microsoft would go onto develop Windows which would provide a graphical
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interface to the operating system, simplifying the use of computers and propelling
personal computer sales to the mass global dominance that it has today.150
Microsoft Windows was not only an operating system (the definition of which
becomes heavily contentious to the case) but was also the software environment for
which Microsoft and others started developing many Microsoft Windows compatible user
software applications including but not limited to word processors, spreadsheet tools,
drawing tools, calculators, games, and many others. This further popularized Microsoft’s
operating system as the number of complementary goods (i.e. computer applications that
consumers use) that were functional with Windows kept increasing, which led to
Microsoft holding over 95% of the market share in the operating system used by the
1990s.151 The 1990s also marked the advent of the mainstream use of the internet
requiring computer users to install internet browsers and at the time the top name in the
industry was Netscape Navigator occupying 70% of the market share.152 This was the
case until Microsoft prepackaged an integrated web browser with its operating system
called the Internet Explorer, adding yet another application to the catalog of applications
usable on Microsoft Windows OS.
It is only evident that consumers would want to buy the operating system that has
the most applications available and that developers would produce applications for the
operating system with the largest consumer base – a simple case of network effects,
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innovation and first-mover advantage (discussed in-depth in Chapter 3). Except, that was
not the case. While Microsoft’s innovative success played a significant role in their rapid
growth, behind the scenes, the story had a lot less to do with just an entrepreneurial spirit
and a lot more to do with predatory pricing and a show of intense anti-competitive
behavior. The Federal Trade Commission began investigating the popular tech giant in
the early 1990s and it all culminated in the era-defining Court antitrust case that would go
on to set the precedent for competition in the tech sector in America for decades to come.
4.2.2. Case Allegations
The allegations brought forth against Microsoft by the U.S. Department of Justice, the
Attorney General of 20 States and the District of Columbia are noted below:153
(1) Microsoft was in violation of §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for illegally
possessing monopoly power for operating systems (OS) in the market for Intelbased personal computers (PC).
(2) Microsoft was in violation of §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for forming
exclusionary contracts with original equipment managers (OEMs) and internet
service providers (ISPs) and partaking in anticompetitive behavior to maintain
their monopoly power.
(3) Microsoft was in violation of §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for attempting to
monopolize the market for internet browsers, namely with their product Internet
Explorer by using illegal exclusionary tactics.
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(4) Microsoft was in violation of §1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for bundling
Microsoft Internet Explorer with its Microsoft Windows operating system.
The details of each allegation are further discussed in each subsequent section. For
reference to the Sherman Act, please refer to Chapter 2, page 9.
4.2.3. Explanation of Charges
(1) Microsoft was in violation of §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for illegally
possessing monopoly power for operating systems (OS) in the market for Intelbased personal computers (PC).
For the purposes of this antitrust case, the DOJ defined the relevant market for
operating systems to be limited to Intel-based personal computers (the dominantly sold
computers at the time). It was also noted that the operating system software was a market
good that had a high initial fixed cost but negligible marginal costs and that this could in
part play into the low prices that they maintained. It was thus up to the courts to
determine whether there were significant barriers to entry and if Microsoft was playing a
role in artificially enhancing those to maintain its monopoly market shares. One of the
primary barriers to entry noted for any competitors in the operating systems market was
the availability of the number of compatible software applications and they termed it the
“applications barriers to entry.” Any other operating system entering the market would
not be a viable competitor if they did not have a similarly competitive software
applications catalog.
The Java programming platform developed by Sun Corp. used by many software
developers at the time allowed developers to build multi-platform applications that could
run on any operating systems. Microsoft specifically built a Windows-only iteration of
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Java and distributed it to software developers in order to make sure that the applications
that they built would be exclusive to their operating system. Given that developers were
already incentivized to create applications for the operating system with the largest
market share, this further limited the number of applications available on other operating
systems even if they were to come up.154 Microsoft’s actions were, in particular, noted to
artificially and illegally maintain its monopoly power and protect itself against the
competition arising with the rise of Netscape Navigator web browsers which could be run
on multiple operating systems and could itself run many applications.
(2)Microsoft was in violation of §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for forming
exclusionary contracts with original equipment managers(OEMs) and internet
service providers (ISPs) and partaking in anticompetitive behavior to maintain their
monopoly power.
Microsoft formed exclusionary contracts with Original Equipment Managers
(OEMs) and also coded in certain elements into their operating system to monopolize the
market for their Internet Browser, Internet Explorer. First, they took measures to ensure
that if Netscape Navigator was pre-installed into their Windows OS, it would cause
system issues or be confusing to find. Second, they refused to license Windows 95 to
OEMs without Internet Explorer pre-packaged into it and also made it so that they could
not uninstall it. Both of these actions significantly hurt Netscape’s market shares as
OEMs could not install alternative browsers for users. Last, Microsoft used a variety of
incentives and threats to make sure that prominent OEMs would favor their web browsers
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over Netscape’s regardless of the merits of the products. They did so by placing
Windows license restrictions with threats of litigation, where they barred them from
removing Internet Explorer from the Desktop and Menu Items, making any changes to
the boot sequence, or allowing any competing software applications to be placed on the
Desktop.155 Microsoft also had contracts with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) whereby
they were given referral fees for providing free copies of Internet Explorer to be given to
users when they set up internet access in their homes. This further hurt Netscape
Navigator’s market shares as they were charging $20 for their browser at the time.
Microsoft was pursuing an artificial monopoly by predatory pricing in this “browser war”
despite not earning any revenue from it, only being able to do due to its monopoly power
in the operating systems market.156
(3) Microsoft was in violation of §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for attempting to
monopolize the market for internet browsers, namely with their product Internet
Explorer by using illegal exclusionary tactics.
Microsoft not only provided Internet Access Providers (IAPs) with free copies of
Internet Explorer to distribute but also made outright payments and granted rebates to top
IAPs to bundle their client software with Internet Explorer and upgrade their existing
customers with Internet Explorer as well. Microsoft Windows had an Online Services
Folder which they used as a referral server for IAPs, so they threatened that if any of the
IAPs increased their orders of Netscape Navigator, then they would no longer be on the
list of referrals157. This sort of aggressive exclusionary anticompetitive behavior went on
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to further hurt Netscape’s market shares and establish the artificial dominance of a more
inferior product.
(4) Microsoft was in violation of §1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act for bundling
Microsoft Internet Explorer with its Microsoft Windows operating system.
Microsoft already had a monopoly in the operating systems market and for the
purposes of this particular charge, web browsers were considered a separate market. This
bundling (beneficial or not) negatively affected competitors in the secondary market (i.e.
Netscape Navigator) and consumers were forced to accept this bundle without a choice.158
Microsoft also prevented OEMs from uninstalling this from the bundle by removing
Internet Explorer from the Add/Remove Program Utilities and coded in difficulties in
setting another web browser as the default browser. They made it virtually impossible to
unbundle Windows OS from Internet Explorer.
4.2.4. Microsoft’s Defense
Microsoft defended their case by making the argument that because of a previous
Court of Appeals decision from 1998159 they were legally entitled to add new features to
their Windows OS and were thus not in any violation of the law by integrating and
bundling Internet Explorer to the operating systems that they were selling. They also
argued that their actions against Netscape were merely competitive in nature and not
exclusionary by any means.160 The courts did not accept Microsoft’s justification given
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that they were using their monopoly power to hurt their competition’s market shares with
predatory pricing and because their action did not further competition based on merits.161
Their defense made a case that Microsoft did not hold monopoly power in the
operating systems market, and it was thus impossible for them to use their monopoly
position in the operating systems market to illegally affect the outcomes of the web
browsers market. Microsoft made the argument that the technology industry was too fast
paced for any company to hold on to a monopoly and that the competition was too
ruthless for Microsoft to be considered one. This Schumpeterian creative destruction
notion of innovation and competition was put forth but not defended well by their
economic witnesses.162 Microsoft could not make a strong enough case to justify that they
were not a monopoly and the court ultimately noted that they were a monopoly given that
they could raise their prices significantly above competition level for a long enough time
without losing market shares to any new market entrants (i.e. SSNIP test). The court also
did not accept the excuses of innovative patterns in the technological industry or their
efforts to keep low prices as sufficient explanations to their defense that they were not a
monopoly.163
Microsoft’s defense argument was built on the idea that their role as innovators
providing low prices (and free products in some cases) led to consumer welfare and that
this was made possible due to their large market share, and that they should not be
persecuted for it.164 Their defense argument leaned heavily on the Chicago School of
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Antitrust Laws in valuing consumer welfare over competition (discussed thoroughly in
Chapter 2, pg. 15). They reiterated this point in their defense against the bundling
allegation suggesting that the Windows OS and Internet Explorer were being sold to a
single market and that this should not constitute bundling as they were simply making
improvements to their previous product. Despite the precedent set by the Court of
Appeals, the sitting Judge decided that the character of demand for both the products
were different and they were ultimately not in the same market since consumer
perception of products need to be considered when evaluating the markets for goods (for
more on relevant market measurements, see discussion on Appendix 1).
4.2.5. Ruling
The Courts ultimately found Microsoft in violation of §2 of the Sherman Act by
possessing a monopoly power in the market for operating systems on Intel-based personal
computers and engaging in illegal exclusionary behavior by imposing license restrictions
on OEMs thus setting up evident barriers to entry for their competitors. They were also
found in violation of this for designing elements in their Windows OS which would make
it impossible to remove Internet Explorer from the system. They were found in violation
of §2 of the Sherman Act for their illicit behavior in regards to building a Microsoft-only
Java code and tricking developers into using the code to ensure that developers only built
applications for Windows OS instead of building multi-platform applications which
hindered competition in the operating systems market.165
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Microsoft was found in violation of all the charges alleged initially but the
decision was appealed and ultimately a lot of the charges were reversed, namely: for
building an incompatible Java Virtual Machine, for distributing Internet Explorer for free
and providing paid incentives to IAPs to upgrade existing customers to Internet Explorer,
and for tying Internet Explorer to Windows OS.166 At the end of the appeals, Microsoft
was not found in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act.
In 2001, Microsoft and the DOJ reached a settlement whereby both parties agreed
that Microsoft would share its Application Programming Interface with competitive
programs, that they would not retaliate against any OEMs and ISVs that helped promote
any competitors and that they would have to allow an impartial expert panel to look over
their internal proceedings to make sure that they were following through with court
orders167. This settlement was highly controversial and the subject of many debates as the
consequences seemed very mild compared to what a lot of people thought was a blatant
show of anticompetitive behavior.
4.2.6. European Commission vs. Microsoft
In 1998, Sun Microsystem Inc. brought forth charges against Microsoft alleging
that Microsoft was withholding the use of certain interoperability functions that inhibited
Sun’s abilities to compete as a work group server operating system supplier.168This
ultimately led the European Commission to begin its investigation into Microsoft in
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2000169 due to the inoperability of Windows OS to run software applications from other
manufacturers and also their tying of Windows Media Player to its Windows OS.
Microsoft was facing allegations for violating two treaties that guard against
anticompetitive behavior undertaken by companies holding dominant positions in the
market, Article 82 (now Article 102) and Article 54170 (noted in Appendix 4). After
requesting access to Microsoft’s non-confidential documents, the European Commission
proceeded with the investigation for two years upon which they decided to run an
extensive market enquiry in 2003.
The European Commission’s documents very strictly defined the three relevant
product markets significant to this case, notably the operating systems market, the work
group server operating systems market and the streaming media player market. The
market inquiry found that while the first two relevant markets did not have significant
substitutes available. Microsoft tried to claim that media players were merely additions to
operating systems and should be viewed as one product market but due to the availability
of standalone media player substitutes, their defense was not accepted.171Given the global
reach of Microsoft, the European Commission decided to consider the whole world as the
relevant geographic market.172
They noted that Microsoft had an exceptionally large market share (standing at
over 90% at the time of the case)173 and due to the self-reinforcing nature of the number
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of applications available and the number of users, it was highly unlikely that their
competitive edge was likely to end soon, setting up high barriers to entry for the
operating systems market with an ever-growing monopoly. They also held nearly 50-75%
of the market share in the work group server operating systems market based on a couple
of different measures of market shares174 and their closest competitors Netware and Linux
barely occupied 6.75%175 of the market. So, while Microsoft’s position as a dominant
firm in itself was not an issue for the purposes of the investigation, their actions to inhibit
competition was a violation of Article 82. The European Commission noted that
Microsoft was at full liberty to supply their interoperability information to the companies
that it chose to but further analysis of the case showed that their action was specifically
undertaken to hurt Java’s entry into the market and ended up hurting consumer welfare
(Microsoft argued vehemently against this point).176 Regardless of welfare, the European
Commission ultimately decided that Microsoft was diminishing consumer choices and
inhibiting innovation and competition and were ultimately charged in violation under
Article 82.177
As for the tying of the Windows Media Player to Windows OS allegation, the
market inquiry proved that the character of demand for both the goods were inherently
different and that the availability of substitutes in the market for the product proved that
they were a separate relevant market (especially given that Microsoft itself marketed a
version of Windows Media Player for Apple’s operating system). They clearly had a
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dominant market share in the operating systems market and thus tying their media player
(without the option to receive the dominant product without the tied product) to their
Windows OS was in violation of Article 82 since it hinders competition in the market for
streaming media players.
At the conclusion of this case in 2004, Microsoft was charged and then fined EUR
497.2 million with the order to disclose their interoperability functions and to provide
versions of Windows that are not bundled with Windows Media Player. They also set up
a monitoring board to ensure that Microsoft complied with the decisions put forward by
the court. Microsoft then tried to appeal the fines under a merit case which were
ultimately rejected in 2008 and they were fined an additional EUR 899 million for not
complying with the earlier decision, this was ultimately reduced to EUR 860 million in
2012.178
4.3. Google Case Details
The most visited site on the internet179, Google has become not only a global
staple for web users, but its popularity has reached heights to carve itself a spot in
everyday lexicon. It has come far from its origins as the small Stanford student search
engine project built by its founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin in 1995180 to the massive
corporate powerhouse sprawling multiple technological fields such as online advertising,
cellular technology, global positioning system (GPS), gaming, cloud services, artificial
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intelligence and more (eventually coming under the umbrella of the conglomerate of
Alphabet Inc.).
Being one of the biggest names in technology, if not the biggest it certainly drew
attention to how they might have been using their industry position to manipulate their
ventures in other markets. Though the Federal Trade Commission led some small
investigations into Google’s anticompetitive behavior, not much progressed in this side of
the pond.181 The European Union, on the other hand, tackled this case intensely which led
to the biggest technology sector antitrust investigation of the decade against a behemoth
of a company. Taking place almost two decades after the infamous Microsoft case, the
Google antitrust proceedings are highly significant to the understanding of the role of
antitrust laws in the constantly evolving technology sector and how important it is for the
laws and theories that regulate technology to be as dynamic as the sector is.
4.3.1 Setting
Over the years, Google has been the subject of multiple antitrust investigations in
the European Union, but for the purposes of this paper the three largest antitrust cases are
being considered. Due to the nature of how antitrust investigations begin in the European
Union, the cases were initially brought forth by various companies facing the brunt of
their anticompetitive behavior, but soon more companies joined in on the litigation
process. The first case investigated was in regards to Google Shopping in 2010182 for
using their dominant position in the search service providers market (i.e. Google Search)
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to preferentially advertise their own services (i.e. Google Shopping) over their
competitors. This led them to examine Google for imposing license restrictions on
companies advertising on their platform (named Google AdSense) which affected their
ability to advertise ads from competing advertising platforms (notably Microsoft’s Bing
or Yahoo’s Yahoo! Search),183 leading to the second big antitrust investigation regarding
Google AdSense, which is an advertisement plug-in that different websites can use to
display search ads on their own website.184 The exclusive supply obligations further
strengthened the stronghold that Google had in the online advertising market (accounting
for almost 70% of the market share at the time of the case).185 The last and the biggest of
the antitrust charges brought forth against Google was against their illegal anticompetitive tactics with the proliferation of its Android platform in 2015.186 Google was
investigated for tying its Android mobile operating system (for which it had an 80%
dominant market share187) to its Google Search application and also its Google Chrome
Web Browser. They were also investigated for making illegal payments to device
manufacturers for exclusively installing Google Search application on their devices and
for obstructing the development of competing Android operating systems.188
For almost ten years, Google grew at an unprecedented rate globally without any
regulatory checks, and while innovation and their contribution to it must be celebrated, it
is also important to examine how even two decades after the Microsoft case, technology
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companies continue to believe that they can out-innovate the laws set in place that helped
companies like them to arise in the first place. Technology has come a long way since
1998 and will continue to evolve further and further as market definitions get even
blurrier, this is why it is fundamentally important to examine the three antitrust cases
against one of the biggest consumer-facing technology conglomerates existing today. It is
not merely a guideline in what to do to ensure that competition continues to exist in a
field that demands it, but a retrospective in how it needs to evolve with time.
4.3.2. Case Allegations
(1) In the 2010 European Commission investigation which concluded in 2017,
Google was alleged to be in infringement of Article 102 of the TFEU and Article
54 of the EEA Agreement (noted in Appendix 4) for preferential advertising of
their Google Shopping services compared to their competitors on their search
services which hold a dominant market share.189
(2) Though initially a part of the broader investigation from 2010, in 2016, the
European Commission accused Google for having protected its dominant position
in the online advertising market (for its product Google AdSense) through
exclusionary market tactics. Their anti-competitive behavior and abuse of
dominant market position was in violation of Article 102 of the TFEU and Article
54 of the EEA Agreement.190
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(3) In 2015, the European Commission began its third investigation into Google
whereby they were alleging that Google was in violation of both Article 101 and
Article 102 of the TFEU (noted in Appendix 4) for their conduct in regards to
their Android operating system, especially in terms of the tying of the Google
Search application and Google Chrome application to the Android mobile
operating system. They were also under investigation for hindering the
development and market access for competing mobile and tablet operating
systems.
4.3.3. Explanation of Charges
(1) Google Shopping
It is important to understand the nature of online search services like Google
Search which helps index and rank relevant websites based on user queries entered
compared to the more specialized vertical search services which provide more nuanced
services (such as comparing and ranking prices for goods across different websites).191
Though all variants of search services tend not to charge users a fee for using their
service, the European Commission considers it an economic activity due to the exchange
of user data (whereby they consider data as a currency),192the use of the search results
page as an advertising platform (which in turn brings in revenue) and that the competition
to draw new users in the online search services market occurs not through their prices but
through the quality of the service (namely user interface, relevancy and speed of

191

Antonio Buttà, “Google Search (Shopping): An Overview of the European Commision’s Antitrust Case,” Italian
Antitrust Review 2, no. 1 (2018), https://doi.org/10.12870/iar-12872.
192
European Data Protection Supervisor, “Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay Between
Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy” (Brussels, 2014),
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf.

75

results).193 The Commission found that for the purposes of this investigation there were
two relevant product markets: the online search services market and the specific search
services market of comparison shopping services. They noted after their market inquiry
that there was limited demand-side and supply-side substitutability between the two
products. They also decided that the relevant geographic markets were “national in
scope.”194
Google had a dominant market share in online search services in all of the EEA
aside from the Czech Republic since 2011 and was found abusing its dominant position
to favor its own comparison shopping service Google Shopping in its search results
compared to its competitors. Google Shopping was prominently featured in search results
whereas they designed algorithms to lower ranks of competitor services and show them
in less visible positions on the results page. This diverted away traffic from competitors
to their own service. 195
The Commission then ran further inquiries to provide evidence as to why this
action would have anticompetitive effects finding that users tend to click more on more
prominently visible links which would lead to more traffic to that service and that more
favorable rankings lead to more traffic which was found evident in the fact that Google
Shopping got more traffic due to its position on the page.196 Additionally, it was found
that Google Search services accounted for a huge portion of the traffic for the competing
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comparison shopping services and that there were no substitute search services that could
lead to those numbers.197
All the investigation led the Commission to ultimately decide that Google with its
Google Search had not only a dominant market position but also significant market
influence on consumer choice, which could not only affect the entry of new competitors
in the other services but completely diminish the ability to compete for any competitors
they might already have.198 This had significant negative implications for consumer
welfare, innovation and competition.
(2) Google AdSense
Created in 2003, Google AdSense was built to provide an intermediary service to
website owners to ease the process of advertising on their websites. Once the website
owners plugged in Google AdSense into their web pages or the specialized search
services on their websites, they could expect a revenue stream based on the amount of
views that were directed to the ads. Both Google and the website owner received
commissions for the advertisements displayed.199 The relevant product market for the
purpose of this case was online search advertising intermediation and the relevant
geographic market being analyzed was the European Economic Area for which Google
had a dominant market share of 80% for the product.200
Through their investigation, the Commission found that Google was imposing
anti-competitive supply obligations in their contracts with their “direct partners” where
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they prohibited them from placing ads from Google’s competitors up till 2009.201When
those exclusivity contracts were relaxed a little, they still contractually obligated their
partners to place Google ads in premium locations on the websites without any other ads
near them.202 They also required the website owners to seek Google’s approval before
making any changes to competitor’s ads.203 In this case, Google was not leveraging its
dominance in the search services market like the other cases, but using its dominance in
the intermediary advertising services market to inhibit competition by preventing
consumers (the website owners) from purchasing products from competing suppliers
through exclusivity contracts.204 Google was using anti-competitive practices to protect its
dominance in the market for intermediary advertising services.
(3) Google Android
Through their investigation, the European Commission decided that the relevant
product market for this case were general internet search services, licensable smart
mobile operating systems and app stores for the Android mobile operating system.205
Google Android is a licensable smart mobile operating system which unlike the Apple
iOS (which is a vertically integrated smart mobile operating system exclusively available
to Apple iPhones) is available for integration by third party mobile handset
manufacturers.206 Google Playstore is the app store for Android mobile operating systems,

201

Aurelien Portuese, “Google AdSense for Search: Fines Always Come in Threes,” Competition Policy International,
2019, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/google-adsense-for-search-fines-always-come-inthrees/#_edn4.
202
European Commission, “Antitrust: Commission Takes Further Steps in Investigations Alleging Google’s
Comparison Shopping and Advertising-Related Practices Breach EU Rules.”
203
Ibid.
204
Portuese, “Google AdSense for Search: Fines Always Come in Threes.”
205
European Commission, “Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on Android Operating
System and Applications – Factsheet.”
206
Ibid.

78

where Android users can download software applications for their Android smartphones.
These are the Google products along with Google Search that came into question under
the purview of this case. The relevant geographic market was limited to the European
Economic Area.207
Google was found to be holding a dominant market position (over 90%) in all
three of the relevant product markets.208 When it came to Google Android, there were
significant barriers to entry for new competitors noted due to the large number of
applications available for the platform (due to the large number of users) as a result of
network effects (discussed further in Chapter 3, pg. 39). There was also limited
substitutability due to the fact that most users were unlikely to switch their mobile
operating systems as it is harder to transfer application data across devices with different
mobile operating systems.209 It is also important to note that almost 90% of all
applications downloaded on Android devices were downloaded via the Google Playstore,
most users also did not have the option to download alternative app stores and for them to
have access to other app stores they would need to switch devices (which is unlikely).210
Google, with its dominant market position, was accused of participating in two
anticompetitive acts of tying, namely, tying the Google Search application to all Android
devices and tying the Google Chrome web browser application to all Android devices.
The pre-installation of both of these applications to the Android mobile operating systems
created what the Commission called a “status quo bias” where users are less likely to
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switch to alternative applications if certain software applications are already preloaded
onto their phones due to the high switching costs.211 This inhibited the competition in both
of those markets within the app store.
Google was also found in violation for making illegal payments to the largest
manufacturers of mobile devices and mobile network operators to incentivize them to
integrate Google Search exclusively across the platform on all their Android devices.212
This hindered the ability of rival search services to compete against Google on the basis
of merit and helped to artificially protect Google’s already dominant position in the
market. Their anti-competitive tactics left their rivals in a precarious position where even
if they could provide a better product, they had further barriers of entry in terms of
compensating device manufacturers for the payments they would have lost from
Google.213
Last, it should be noted that some manufacturers use their own variants of the
Android mobile operating system exclusively (notably Amazon’s Fire OS) since Android
is an open source operating system; these are referred to as Android forks. Google
contractually obligated other third party device manufacturers to never use any of these
Android “forks” and if they were found in violation of the contract, they were threatened
with the loss of access to all other Google services including Google Search, Google
Playstore and others.214 This “Anti-Fragmentation Agreement” significantly inhibited
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competition in the licensable smart mobile operating systems market, limited innovation
in terms of the software applications that it could give rise to and negatively affected
consumer welfare by limiting consumer choices and their access to alternative and
potentially better products.
4.3.4. Google’s Defense
Though the cases are relatively new and the complete case files were not available
for inspection for the AdSense and the Android cases as of writing this paper, the press
releases and supplemental discussions regarding the cases provide insight as to some of
the defenses that Google might have had to these accusations.
First, in the case of Google Shopping, Google defended themselves by suggesting
that the position and outlook of the comparison shopping services on Google Search did
not affect the amount of traffic that went to the services.215 The market inquiry and
analysis had proved this untrue.216They also claimed that Google Shopping was not a
comparison shopping service, but in fact just an improved version of their Google
AdWords service (keyword based advertising bidding service).217 There was significant
evidence available to the fact that this was a separate product given that users had
separate sets of data interactions with it.218 Google also tried to defend their case by
noting that other comparison shopping services could simply participate in Google
Shopping and then they would have access to the premium page locations, but this was
found to be not as accessible as they framed it as AdWords spots could be auctioned to
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unlimited bidders but the spots for Google Shopping were not as easily
available.219Google’s final defense in this case was that they applied the same relevance
standards when finding comparison shopping services as they did in their general search
services and their product ads. Google provided no concrete evidence to support this
claim and their user study did not address the issue well.220 All their claims were
ultimately unfounded.221
Though Google’s own defenses on the AdSense case are not available but some
literature on the topic have discussed the fact that Google AdSense requires exclusive and
premium placements for the viability of their two-sided business model222 given that they
provide the service to web owners for free. Though it is debatable whether a cost
advantage and consumer welfare alone are justifiable reasons for inhibiting competition
and innovation, it does bring to question whether Google AdSense finds that their
business model necessitates relationship-specific investments223 from their partners to
carry on their ad-based revenue service.
Last, in terms of the Google Android case where Google was accused of tying the
Android operating system with Google Search and Google Chrome, they defended
themselves by noting that tying was necessary to monetize its investment into Android.224
This defense did not stand as Google had a significant revenue stream from Android
devices through their Google Playstore and through the data that they collected from
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these devices.225 The Commission also dismissed their claims that their exclusivity
contracts with device manufacturers regarding the pre-installation of Google Search was
necessary to ensure that device manufacturers would keep producing Android devices.226
Finally, their claims that they only obstructed manufacturers from using Android forks to
prevent fragmentation of their Android ecosystem was unfounded since they could
simply require that the Android forks were up to the technical standards necessary to
operate other Google applications. They also did not provide any evidence to suggest that
these Android forks were incompatible with their Google applications.227
4.3.5. Ruling
On June 27, 2017, it was announced that Google was going to be fined EUR 2.42
billion for their anticompetitive behavior in regards to the Google Shopping case. They
were also asked to immediately cease all of the actions that they faced charges for.
Google was asked to ensure that their Google Shopping service received similar
treatment as any other comparison shopping services on their Google Search service.228
On March 20, 2019, it was announced that Google was going to be fined EUR
1.49 billion for their illicit practices regarding the Google AdSense case. They were
asked to (and had stopped by 2016) their illegal conduct in regards to the exclusive
supply dealings.229
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On July 18, 2018, Google was fined EUR 4.34 billion for their exclusionary
behavior in regards to the Google Android case. They were also ordered to cease all
illegal actions within 90 days of the decision. While they had to ensure that device
manufacturers were allowed to use any Android forks of their choice, Google was
allowed to set up technical prerequisites to ensure that the Android ecosystem was still
properly functional.230 Though the fines and the decisions have been set, it is likely that
Google will challenge these decisions and appeals may be filed soon.
4.3.6. Google in the United States
There was a brief investigation into Google by the Federal Trade Commission in
2011 pertaining to its behavior in regard to the way it launched its Google Buzz service
through its already large Gmail service, the investigation ultimately ended in a settlement
where both parties agreed on better protection for consumer data privacy.231 This never
grew into a full-blown antitrust investigation. There was, however, another investigation
regarding its Google Search service where the efficacy and neutrality of their algorithm
was questioned once again. Rival services for travel vertical search engines like Expedia
were less likely to be shown in searches compared to Google’s own services despite their
claims of neutrality.232 The only big issue found was that Google was lifting user reviews
from rival reviewing sites to display on their Google Search but threatened to completely
drop the rival sites when they complained about it.233 This case ultimately led to a
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settlement with promises of better business ethos from Google where they also agreed to
remove exclusivity contracts with companies advertising on their advertising platform.234
Though the cases pursued were definitely worth the attention, not much has
occurred in terms of an in-depth antitrust investigation against Google’s greater
misconducts in the United States, there is news that the US Department of Justice is
planning a bigger antitrust probe into the company soon.235While previous precedents set
in the courts do not suggest a lot will be accomplished in terms of regulating Google and
its anticompetitive practices, there is at least hope for a stronger case to be made.
4.4. Conclusion
Microsoft and Google have held dominant market shares in a variety of markets
in the information technology industry and continues to expand their frontiers today into
newer markets such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, robotics and others.236
Their monopoly status and vast profits from other ventures allow them to invest and
outcompete if not, absorb any new entrants in any new field that they enter.237 It is
imperative to recognize that these monopolies need to be regulated thoroughly unless one
imagines the future of information technology to be limited to a few select names where
the incentive to innovate by any new entrant is curtailed. The cases brought forth against
Microsoft and Google recognized the danger that they posed as monopolies in this field
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given the sheer scale of their monopoly power and also showed the extent of abusive
market conduct possible by these information technology firms.
The Microsoft case in the United States was a landmark case that took place
before most legislative bodies could identify the full extent of tacit behaviors facilitated
by information technology when operating at economies of scale. It also highlighted the
flaws of the Chicago School’s influence in the American court system’s decision making
with their heavy focus on consumer welfare and efficiency rather than the preservation of
competition. However, the case is still vital to the study of how legislative bodies
examine the economics behind information technology, and is a guide in what they
caught onto early on and also what they missed. This is perhaps why the European
Commission had better success with their Microsoft case which occurred a few years
later, but this could also be attributed to their more hardline post-Chicago implementation
of the law rather than just lessons from the Americans.
In the 20 years since Microsoft, another global tech giant rose to power and
eventually faced antitrust challenges of their own. Google with its dominant market
shares in various platforms (some integrated within other Google platforms) led to a far
more complex case than the Microsoft case, but a closer look made it evident that the
general themes were the same even though the scale was drastically different.
Information technology had evolved a lot since the Microsoft case and yet the pattern of
abuse displayed by Google implied that information technology incentivized and
facilitated certain types of market abuse which are different from general market abuses,
and while newer technologies may be introduced, and certain names may change, a little
flexibility will allow antitrust bodies to recognize their misconducts better. Aside from
86

this, the Google case also set a precedent for the incorporation of data into antitrust
analysis which could potentially have important implications for any future cases. The
European Commission prosecuted Google on all of the charges they presented and while
that is to be commended, there is still room to examine if they could have been sensitive
to more elements of this technology.
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CHAPTER 5:
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES
5.1. Introduction
Though antitrust laws have been more or less stagnant since its conception, the
economic theories affecting its applications have seen periodic changes across both the
United States and Europe. However, these changes have not arrived as rapidly as the
changes in technology and now, information technology. Traditional interpretations of
the laws and technologies have led to many decisions that were widely debated for years
to come and helped to shape the intellectual landscape around these topics. Before
Google and Microsoft, there was AT&T, where they had nearly reached the sheer scale of
horizontal and vertical integration as today’s tech firms and caught the attention of
antitrust authorities in the United States. They were an effective monopoly in most
sectors of the telecommunications market, being the primary telephone service provider
in most of North America while also holding majority market shares in telephone
manufacturing, communications research facilities and other complementary goods
pertaining to this sector such as telephone books.238This is often likened to how today’s
tech giants have sprawling subsidiaries across various platforms which allow them to
become the sole provider for most common consumer technology needs without the
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ability to find an alternative (i.e. high switching costs due to lack of network effects on
other ecosystems). They were protected for the longest time under the presumption that
they were a natural monopoly, however it is important to distinguish that large economies
of scales are not always the result of natural monopolies – it was not for AT&T and it is
not for today’s tech monopolies; the rise of competition in the telecommunication
industry following AT&T’s divestiture was proof of that. The government would have
broken up the large conglomerate at the end of the case, but AT&T ultimately chose to
settle fearing the loss of one of its larger companies, Western Electric. Instead, they split
up the company into smaller parts.239 This significantly improved competition in the
telecommunications market as new companies entered the market, and while they failed
to make a mark in the up-and-coming technology sector (as they were expected to)
without their guaranteed user base, parts of the AT&T corporation went onto thrive and
exists today as another media behemoth.240
While the legislators did settle on a relatively favorable outcome, the AT&T case
and the company’s continued success is a reminder that not only are antitrust laws
necessary but that they are also not designed to impede growth and innovation but
instead, create room for it. The problem, however, arises when the legislation and the
economics behind the laws fail to capture the nuances of the specific industries and
inhibiting enforcement. Despite positive intentions and the dire need for government
oversight in these industries, antitrust legislation into these industries are often questioned
due to the ambiguity of their technologies. In this chapter, the difficulties of employing
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traditional antitrust methods in information technology industries will be discussed
followed by an analysis of the case studies elaborated on in the previous chapter. The
literature around the analysis of the Microsoft case is meant to serve as a framework for
the analysis of the Google case, which will reflect on how today’s antitrust laws are
lacking in their abilities to deal with the information technology sector today and how it
is vital for changes to be made soon.
5.2. The Limitations of Antitrust Laws in the Information Technology Sector
Despite its various interpretations, the basic tenets of antitrust laws are built
around the economic idea that a firm holding significant market power has the ability to
charge higher prices and produce fewer goods than that would have been produced under
perfect competition. A firm in this position, can then abuse its monopoly power through a
variety of anticompetitive techniques to limit new entrants and limit consumer choice
(discussed in Chapter 3). While the merits and demerits of perfect competition could be a
subject of its own paper, the previous chapters emphasize why an environment that
fosters competition is, at the very least, conducive to technological innovation as well.
Despite semantic differences, irrespective of industries, most legislative bodies face the
burden of proving two main issues when trying to prosecute in most antitrust cases, the
fact that the firm holds monopoly power and that they are in fact abusing it.
Proving the market power happened to be relatively easy for the greater part of
the century as market power could be easily identified despite deliberations over various
calculation methods (noted in the Appendix 2). The two important details needed to
administer calculations by most legislative bodies are relevant geographic and product
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markets,241 and while these details were debated in other antitrust cases, they are nowhere
near as complex to analyze as they are in the cases of digital products which are marketed
and distributed globally to anyone who has access to the internet. Though the scope of
market power has been attempted to be understood by the number of active units sold or
downloaded, in the case of certain technologies even those numbers are redundant as
daily active users can vary. It becomes even more complicated when large tech
monopolies have products that compete with other slightly-differentiated products inside
of certain digital-only markets (notably, Google apps inside the Google Playstore inside
Android devices). This makes market assessments significantly harder than it used to be
in the case of tangible goods and services distributed in certain regions. A big issue that
arises in the analysis of market power is also the lack of appropriate tools to measure
market power in information technology industries fairly, for example, the Lerner Index
(P-MC/P) lead to excessive number of false positives as it does not account for the high
fixed costs or negligible marginal costs in this industry.242
There is also the added issue regarding the durability of information technology
products in case of antitrust analysis. While they are durable goods, they face
obsolescence whether it is planned or not. The “Coase Conjecture” suggests that the
market for durable goods could work similarly to competitive markets as the monopolist
could be incentivized to offer the product closer and closer to marginal cost as demand
starts to fall. If this were a recurring pattern in this industry then consumers would
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anticipate the low prices and would wait out their purchases.243 Though traditionally firms
require a steady flow of consumers or continue to improve their products in order to
avoid the Coase trap, it seems as if the tech firms have found various ways to not price at
the marginal cost. Aside from pushing out updates and newer models on a yearly basis
which lead to hardware and software incompatibilities forcing consumers to make a
purchase (i.e. planned obsolescence), many have also moved to a subscription or rental
model which also ensures a steady stream of revenue.244 Antitrust bodies need to take
into account the changing revenue generation models that these information technology
monopolies utilize, while taking into consideration the durability of these products, in
order to properly evaluate consumer welfare in their pricing practices.
Regulatory bodies also run price-cost analyses to see if firms display significant
market power or not (i.e. if they would alter their prices when new firms enter the
market), but these sort of short-run studies while valuable, tend to offer varying results
for tech firms who are still recovering their initial high fixed costs or for firms who may
offer their products at the “freemium” model (i.e. free version with advertisements, paid
version for additional functions).245 It is reductive to completely isolate the tech firm’s
products when it comes to building antitrust cases, because ultimately they hold market
power across multiple markets with performances across each market affecting their
profits and market shares on others, most notably their shares in the advertising and data
markets. Thus, it is vital for antitrust bodies to take into account their multi-sided
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nature246 when analyzing market power while also being sensitive to the details of their
cost structure (i.e. high fixed costs and negligible marginal costs). With the number of
technology monopolies on the rise, it is imminent that a fair and accurate measure be
devised soon which takes into consideration all these elements.
As discussed in Chapter 3, certain elements of their technology facilitate the
abuse of market power for tech firms more so than traditional firms. While traditional
tests (see Appendix 2) are meant to test for anticompetitive behavior like predatory
pricing, tying and other tactics used to prevent the entry of new rivals into the market,
again, a lot of them will fail to take into effect the dynamic nature of technological
competition and the hostility that is built into the code. Some of the biggest abuses of
power within the tech industry tend not to come from high recoupment prices, but instead
from locking users into their ecosystem, forcing them to face high switching costs,
whether it is through software incompatibilities with other products or through increasing
the ease of use within their own set of products (e.g. Microsoft Office Suite and Google
Suite). Due to the network effects exhibited in this industry, the biggest incentive most
firms initially have is growing their user base and not necessarily their profits, thus the
traditional interpretation of rational firms’ incentives may not be the best lens to examine
their anticompetitive behavior in the short-run. A lot of tech firms also tend to receive
revenues via advertising and through their collection of data, and it is important that
legislative bodies consider the abuses that occur in these unclear markets as well. The
issues regarding identifying market power is that it is not sensitive to the particular
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characteristics of tech firms specifically, as for identifying abuse of power, traditional
tests are often too limited to fully encompass the extent of anticompetitive behavior
exhibited by tech firms.
5.3. Microsoft
The technical details of the Microsoft case study are discussed in the previous
chapter (See Chapter 4, pg. 58). This section will serve as an examination of the literature
surrounding the case in order to evaluate both the failures and strengths of the of the
antitrust bodies and their abilities to regulate one of the earliest behemoths of the tech
industry.
5.3.1. Economic Discourse
In the infamous American trial, Microsoft was alleged to have a monopoly in the
market of operating systems for Intel-based personal computers, holding over 90% of the
market. The relevant product market for this assessment was determined based on the fact
that this was the predominant type of personal computer available in the market at the
time without many substitute operating systems consumers could switch to. 247 It also
appeared that even competitors willing to undertake the high fixed costs of producing a
rival good could not chip away at their market share (most notably IBM with their OS/2
with their $1 billion investment).248 While the failure of newer entrants in this field could
be attributed to Microsoft having an early mover advantage and benefiting from network
effects, there were also the very evident additional network effects around the production
of applications leading to the “applications barrier to entry.” Richard Schmalensee,

247

US Department of Justice, U.S. V. Microsoft Corporation, 98–1233.
Richard J Gilbert and Michael L Katz, “An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 15, no. 2 (2001): 25–44, https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.15.2.25.
248

94

Microsoft’s chief economic expert at the trial argued that the relevant product market was
not for operating systems but in fact for “platforms,” which he described as a set of
software interfaces (including middleware such as web browsers) for applications to
function on; he insisted that Microsoft faced significant competition from the likes of
Apple, Linux, Java and other companies under this market definition.249 He also argued
against market power being a useful indicator for competition in this industry and made a
case for Schumpeterian creative destruction, whereby the radical innovation, network
effects and economies of scale along with catastrophic entries indicated that this industry
was most likely to see a string of short-lived monopolies.250 The government accepted this
dynamic approach to looking at this industry but still noted that the issue was not holding
a monopoly but using anticompetitive means to do so, and it was made clear that
Microsoft was not in fact being persecuted for holding a monopoly due to the nature of its
technology, but what they were further doing to take illicit advantage of their position.
Microsoft was specifically charged for engaging in exclusionary conduct
(elaborated on in Chapter 4, pg. 58) in regards to imposing licensing restrictions on
OEMs and ISPs for the use of Windows OS. They also provided free copies of Internet
Explorer to IAPs and threatened to remove them from their desktop referral folder if they
provided Netscape Navigator as an option. Traditional Chicago interpretations find that
exclusionary contracts promote efficiency as both firms would not agree to such a
contract if it was not more profitable. 251 However, this fails to take into account the
scenario where multiple vendors can start to form exclusionary contracts with one
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supplier which can lead to one supplier holding a dominant market power, which would
inadvertently reduce competition and allow them to engage in anticompetitive behavior:
which can range from price discrimination to enforcing penalties on the vendors for
breaking their contracts.252 This was evident in the case of Microsoft, where if the multisided nature of their operation is to be considered, they were a dominant market power in
the operating systems market and were using that to leverage exclusionary dealings with
these other firms to make gains in the web browsers market.
Predatory behavior in the information technology industry can very rarely utilize
price cutting and recoupment in the same way that other industries can due to the fact that
despite high fixed costs, low marginal costs allow the company to charge low prices.
Most tech monopolies tend to engage in a lot of non-price predatory behavior, some of
which are even facilitated by their technology such as data collection for price
discrimination or easier ability to tie complementary products due to their low marginal
costs which further increases network effects and locks in more consumers. In
Microsoft’s case, their choice to tie Internet Explorer to the Windows OS was such a
tying arrangement that not only increased the market share for the tied product but also
ensured that it was steadily locking in users to the greater Windows OS platform.
Microsoft also paid Apple to use its browser, which debunked their argument that it was
merely a part of their platform and not in fact a product competing with a noteworthy
rival in the market that Apple could option (i.e. Netscape Navigator). This effort to grow
the user base and take advantage of network effects went beyond tacit bundling decisions
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and exclusionary contracting. Microsoft was not charged for their conduct with
independent software vendors (ISVs), where they were providing Windows OS free of
charge to them as an incentive to create applications for Microsoft faster. As noted
before, the DOJ defined the relevant market for operating systems to be limited to Intelbased personal computers and they also opted to take on a very rigid definition of the
market regarding this case, viewing Windows and all the applications written for it as a
set package rather than viewing the market dynamically whereby software applications
could be written for other operating systems thus creating the potential for other
operating systems to become more competitive. In fact, a more fluid view of the market
would allow the courts to note the incentives that software developers would have in
regards to creating applications for Microsoft Windows; incentives which Microsoft
purposefully affected with their practice by artificially inducing the network effect by
providing free access to Windows OS to developers and creating a Microsoft-only
version of Java, so that they would create applications for an OS which more users would
use because there are more applications available. 253
The European Commission case charged Microsoft for the lack of interoperability
in their code and the tying of Windows Media Player to their Windows OS. The latter
charge displayed yet another component of Microsoft’s ever growing ecosystem which it
intended to lock its users into in order to increase their switching costs, while also
continuing to be the sole beneficiary of network effects. However, the first charge was
more in line with their conduct in regards to the Java case in the United States. This is
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where the consideration of the interdependent nature of these products become
imperative once again, especially in how they can affect the growth of competition and
innovation in markets within these platforms. While this case was pursued almost two
decades ago, it foreshadowed the complexities information technology could bear on
competition economics in terms of multiple levels of markets inside of software
programs.
An idea of a benevolent monopoly kept arising in both cases across the Atlantic.
Microsoft’s defense argued that if Microsoft were to be charging a monopoly price, they
would be charging 16 times the market price, which Franklin Fisher, the economist on the
government’s side argued would not be the case as this did not account for their fear of
slowing their user growth rate and possibly deterring the possibility of creating new
demand for complementary goods.254 In the United States, the legal experts have a
predisposition towards the Chicago School of Thought whereby as long as consumer
welfare is unhindered (though very loosely), monopolies are expected to get a pass. It has
led to a judicial atmosphere that fears false positives and the repercussions of inhibiting
“welfare,” “growth” and “innovation.” So, it was not unexpected when Microsoft
ultimately settled with minimal repercussions in the United States. Their European
regulatory counterparts, however, tend to hold a slightly more strict view of
anticompetitive behavior finding the restriction of competition a sufficient reason to
prosecute. There have been mixed econometric evidence in regards to the linkages
between the degree of competition and the degree of innovation255, but it is unlikely that a
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case of Schumpeterian creative destruction is likely to completely displace a tech
monopoly that has sprawled enough subsidiaries. Consumer welfare on the other hand,
while not unanimous with competition, does seem to be closely affected by it in the longrun. While consumers benefited from the low prices and an abundance of applications on
their personal computers in the short-run, in the long-run they were potentially being
locked into a subpar Windows OS with subpar Windows products. Almost two decades
later, Windows still holds nearly 80% of the global desktop operating system market
share.256 Though it has dropped a little more in North America (nearly 70%)257 due to the
surge in Mac and alternative products, it still reigns as the dominant market power.
Despite other Microsoft products thriving, Internet Explorer failed once they stopped
imposing restrictions on ISPs; it has been taken off the market, with its older version
occupying less than 10% of the market today.258
5.3.2. State of Information Technology and Application of Antitrust
While not a first mover, Microsoft definitely benefited from being an early
follower during the beginning stages of affordable personal computer sales. They quickly
amassed a large user base, and the growing network effects incentivized them to invest
more to benefit from the increasing returns that would eventually come from achieving
economies of scale. This was an inevitability with enough of a user growth in this
industry. By the time the late 90s came around, Microsoft was one of the biggest market
powers in the information technology industry and were employing every move available
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to them to hold on to that position. The infamous American case that would follow would
provide the public with their first glimpses into the capabilities of anticompetitive
behavior made possible by this technology and would preface the decades to come where
it would become even more complex.
Like any other information technology firm, Microsoft’s market power is
complex to analyze since information technology behaves differently. A firm would
simply not be punished for experiencing network effects and economies of scale, nor
could a price-cost analysis be employed as they experienced high fixed costs but low
marginal costs relative to their average costs. This would incentivize a firm to reach
economies of scale rather than grow profits, however, it also meant that the market
tended to get concentrated as there were high risks to entry, as new firms may have been
unaware of post-entry equilibrium prices.259 In the case of Microsoft, these were obvious
barriers to entry for new rivals, but Microsoft helped to set up further artificial barriers of
entry both within and outside their code to make the market hostile to any new entrants.
Microsoft had already amassed a network of applications at the time of the case,
while it could be an error in identifying all the technologies involved, but it was
important for the courts to recognize and bring forward more charges of misconduct by
defining more relevant markets beyond the market for Intel-based personal computers.
Though Internet Explorer was noted as a separate product, it was not identified as a
separate relevant market. The applications market was also viewed as a whole rather than
taking into account the inoperability of applications on different platforms, which would
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mean Microsoft was hindering innovation and competition in the market for applications
made for non-Windows operating systems. This specificity in recognizing the multiple
levels of markets within the technologies and also recognizing the multi-sided nature of
these companies would allow for a closer inspection into their flaws while recognizing
how they are able to leverage their dominance in one market to gain dominance in
another unfairly (even with an inferior product). This was evident in how the European
Union chose to analyze their case by defining more relevant markets, which allowed
them to build stronger cases and pick up on the nuance of markets within markets.
It is also important in retrospect to analyze how Microsoft was building a
technological ecosystem to lock its users into, which goes beyond benefitting from the
traditional outcome of network effects. Not only would users benefit from the number of
other users on the platform, the number of applications built for a system with a large
number of users (as programmers do not want to develop as much for smaller user
groups), but also the ease of interoperability of the host applications. This aggressive
move into locking users in through operability functions should have been a concern in
the United States case (with the Java issue, specifically) but did see some attention in the
European Union. Consumers facing high switching costs inhibit competition and will
eventually render the market unsuitable for any substitutes to arise. Both antitrust bodies
should have looked into other instances of interoperability coded into their platform and
host applications, which would have pointed to more anticompetitive behavior.
While Microsoft faced fines and repercussions for some of their anticompetitive
behavior in the European Union, they were allowed to settle with minimal oversight in
the United States with the promise to disengage from their illegal contracts with ISPs and
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IAPs.260 It is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest appropriate remedies, but it can
hopefully help inform on the matters of what transgressions need remedying. It was not
as if the courts in the United States failed to recognize Microsoft’s market abuses, it
merely failed to take action when it was direly needed. The European Commission, on
the other hand, did charge Microsoft, but they faced far fewer charges across the Atlantic
than they deserved, and it was made evident that neither of the world’s biggest courts
were either willing to or capable of bringing these tech monopolies under the proper
oversight that they require. The Microsoft case might have taken place at a time before
the full extent of this technology could be realized, but it is immensely important to
ensure that technology monopolies today are regulated thoroughly and fairly by the most
influential legislative bodies present globally in order to ensure competition, innovation
and consumer welfare.
5.4. Google
Google is one of the largest standing tech monopolies in the global economy.
While it appears that the United States will bring forth antitrust charges against Google in
the near future, as of writing this paper, Google has been hit with a series of fines in
recent years by the European Commission (for more details, see Chapter 4, pg. 83), with
some proceedings still ongoing. The Google case, although widely debated still does not
have the vast array of literature that the Microsoft case had, though with time, it is likely
to become as relevant if not more to study of antitrust in the information technology
sector. This section will discuss the economic debate surrounding the Google case in the
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European Union but will also utilize the reflections from the Microsoft case to better
understand how antitrust laws should accommodate the changing information
technologies of the future.
5.4.1. Economic Discourse
Google’s continued dominant position in the general search services market has
been questioned similarly to the Microsoft case, as this is often the first benchmark at
antitrust investigations. This is followed with the rhetoric of “punishing winners” and the
loss of consumer welfare. The free services are often cited as an example of the
benevolence of this monopoly, disregarding the advertisement revenues or the collection
and sale of data.261 Though there is still not sufficient literature elaborating on how to
correlate concentration with these figures, it is important to at least grasp the transactional
nature of these services. It should also be acknowledged how it does not cost Google
anything to distribute their products due to the negligible marginal costs, and while they
can continue to improve and invest into their products, the free pricing clearly aided in
amassing a large user base early on, which allowed them to benefit from network effects.
Their user base in itself is not a marker of abuse, but when a service is the “primary”
access point to the rest of the internet, it wields a lot of power across multiple markets.
There is no doubt that Google’s market power has bigger repercussions for consumer
choice and welfare than any other tech company, which is why it should be regulated
accordingly.
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The earliest charge against Google pertained to their behavior in regards to
Google Shopping, which is a vertical search service product. Google at the time of the
charges held the dominant position in general search services, but was using this position
to promote their subsidiary on this platform while purposefully demoting competing
products on their general search services. A lot of the economic arguments on behalf of
Google in this case was built around the Chicago rhetoric of consumer welfare and
efficiency. Even if one were to assume Google Shopping was a superior product that
benefited consumers compared to the substitutes, Google was still leveraging their market
power in one market to affect their position in a different market tacitly through their
algorithms (despite their claims against this). The Commission recognized the multisided nature of these markets and identified the relevant markets that were operating at
the different levels, this allowed them to fully examine the level of Google’s control over
the vertical search services market, since competitors relied on them for new users.262
The second case brought forth against Google drew a lot less discussion as it
pertained to very anticompetitive exclusionary contracts in regards to not allowing their
clients to display advertisements from competing advertisement intermediaries. Though
few counter arguments have been made in regards to the economic benefits to both the
supplier and buyer in the contract, which is in line with Chicago style thinking, it is
understandable why the Europeans who lean on a more post-Chicago approach viewed
this as a strategic entry deterrence.263 Google was a dominant player in this market and
the network effects they were creating from such contracts could have lead to
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immeasurable switching costs. If most websites used Google AdSense exclusively then
most advertisers would buy ads there, which in turn would affect website clients’
decisions to enter into these contracts with Google if they had the most advertisers. This
was similar to the setup of the “applications barrier to entry” that Microsoft had devised,
which took advantage of network effects to increase switching costs.
The decision in the Android case where the European Commission charged them
for tying Google Search and Google Chrome to Google Android, drew the most criticism
of all from economic and technology experts alike (the technical details can be reviewed
in Chapter 4, pg. 78). This decision is argued to have harmed the future of open-source
distribution since it failed to recognize how integration within these platforms is vital to
their functioning.264 Others have argued about the efficiencies of the contracts and the
vertical integration of these processes, and how such regulations do more to harm to
consumer welfare than benefit them. Most defenses rely on Google being the victim of
unnecessary prosecution for holding market power when they were merely benefiting
from network effects and not being able to control the result of the “applications barriers
to entry” in the mobile operating systems market. It was argued that they evidently had a
superior product that benefited customers and drew the programmers.265 First of all,
despite being an open-source distribution there are numerous Google products integrated
within the Android platform which collect data for Google and while integration may
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help build a cohesive ecosystem from one firm, it should be acknowledged that Google
can code better operability with non-native applications as well, but chooses not to, thus
inhibiting competition. Second, consumers being robbed of their choices at every level of
using a technological product while being imposed with increasing switching costs every
day is not reflective of consumer welfare. Third, to draw a comparison to Microsoft once
again, “the applications barrier to entry” in their case could be attributed to the fact that
Google Android, the dominant mobile operating system (excluding forks) comes prebuilt with the Google Playstore, which could be argued as a part of the platform but it
happens to be downloadable on other Android devices (including forks), ensuring that if
application programmers wanted to reach the majority of mobile users, they would have
no choice but to program for the Playstore due to the immense network effects. The one
failing in part of the European Union case, was the inability to recognize the application
stores as a separate market from the Android mobile operating system. This would allow
for the recognition of Google Search application for mobile and Google Search on web
browsers as separate products. While the tying of the Chrome web browser was the result
of them leveraging multiple market dominances and using their vertical integration to
inhibit competition, this distinction could have allowed for further prosecution on the
basis of Google Search as the default homepage on Chrome browsers.
The Google cases clearly introduced a lot of nuances to the examination of
antitrust legislation into information technology. While there are still ways in which it
was limited, it opened up a broader dialogue regarding the need for flexible and dynamic
market definitions, expanded on the extent of abuse that a multi-platform monopoly can
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commit and will ultimately help to realize the scope of antitrust in this new rapidly
changing industry.
5.4.2. Information Technology and the Future of Antitrust Applications
Google is a technology giant that has achieved a level of scale and multi-platform
integration that could frankly be hard to imagine let alone asses for the purposes of
antitrust investigations. While innovation is to be rewarded, Google has built upon the
network effects to become in essence the gateway to the internet, which despite its claims
of lack of bias, certainly helped to develop its ever-growing list of complementary
internet products and services. It would be nearly impossible for a new entrant to reach
the economies of scale accomplished by Google, nor is it possible for them to penetrate
the locked-in user base forced to use the majority of Google’s ecosystem with its
hundreds of products. Schumpeterian creative destruction could displace one monopoly
in one market under the right conditions, but to put forward the argument that hundreds
of disruptive entries will occur at the same time and be cohesive enough to remove all
switching costs is a naive thought. Though it began with Google Search, Google has now
leveraged their position into holding dominant market shares in a variety of markets
through a multitude of tacit means facilitated by their scale and their technology. This is
the outcome of an unregulated information technology industry and should serve as a
cautionary tale for why it is imperative that antitrust regulations start to become more
rigorous and informed.
One of the key ideas seen in the Google antitrust trials was the ability of the
European legislators to move towards more fluidity in terms of defining relevant markets.
This was a problem that hindered the Microsoft case. In rapidly changing industries,
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relevant markets will constantly be evolving so it is up to the legal bodies, and the
economists involved to be cognizant of that and define markets accordingly. They also
need to take into account the multi-sidedness of firms (i.e. their functioning in different
sectors affecting outcomes in others) as a lot of the markets one may encounter in the
future might exist within a platform belonging to a certain firm. The idea of vertically
integrated markets should be taken into consideration as well. An example of this can be
Google Docs competing with other document processing mobile applications in the
Google Playstore which competes with other application stores inside of Google Android
Devices which competes with mobile operating systems. In this scenario, Google
operates two of the dominating markets while competing in it; the antitrust implications
of this is confusing but needs to be evaluated especially if competition is inhibited at any
of these stages.
Another important issue which may come to dominate conversations in future
antitrust legislations, is the issue of inter-product operability. Intellectual property rights
are often expensive investments and the proliferate use of these allow firms to protect
their technologies while discouraging newer entrants (the economic literature around IP
rights is vast and could be a paper of its own). Often these are cited as reasons for
refusing to provide the code to ensure easy interoperability to rival products that may
want to compete on their platforms. While the merits and demerits of intellectual property
laws can be debated, it is possible that with the rise these vertically integrated monopolies
with their own platform markets, the question may arise in regards to whether the lack of
interoperability is an explicit abuse of power or not. It increases the switching costs for
consumers who benefit from their network effects, while also making it nearly impossible
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for newer entrants to compete. The deliberate imposing and increasing of switching costs
should be taken into consideration in these analyses, if not, perhaps the reduction of
switching costs could be utilized as a way to promote competition.
This case also helped also set an important precedent in regards to the
acknowledgement of the transactional nature of data. While the economic research in this
field, especially in forming valuations for data to study market concentration in the
information technology industry is still lacking, there is no doubt that this will become an
important issue in future antitrust legislations due to the recent proliferation of data
misuses within the tech sector.266 The value of data is also highlighted in the practice of
targeted advertisement which most of these firms tend to draw revenue from. Data is also
a durable good which loses value quickly but can be collected constantly provided the
company already benefits from a large amount of network effects, these specificities
make the analysis of data for antitrust analysis even more complex. Data collection poses
immense implications within antitrust legislation given its scope to increase market abuse
like price discrimination, it is important that some form of analysis into a firm’s stock of
data be evaluated as a standard for measuring their market power.
Ultimately, in the decade since the Microsoft case in the United States and now at
the face of another landmark antitrust case ahead, it is important to reflect on the failures
of not recognizing the specificities of the information technology industry but also to note
that it is a dynamic, rapidly changing industry which demands flexible interpretations that
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can truly help to regulate the monopolies that have already arisen and could rise in the
future.
5.5. Conclusion
The European Union and the United States are both in positions of power where
they can administer regulations which can have a positive impact on competition in the
information technology industry. Given the global nature of these monopolies, it is
important that other countries (be it unilaterally or multilaterally) also start reinforcing
antitrust measures against these companies to ensure that the competition in the global
information technology sector is not hindered. As these monopolies expand their market
dominance in more and more complex technologies like cloud computing and artificial
intelligence, and broaden their sphere of influence, it becomes even more necessary to
implement these measures as soon as possible. However, this broad analysis of these two
prominent cases, nearly 20 years apart, across two of the biggest legislative bodies
influenced by two entirely different schools of antitrust thought, have shown one thing:
antitrust analysis in the information technology industry is still lacking today.
The findings from the case studies and the concurrent analyses show that certain
patterns have emerged in terms of how information technology monopolies conduct
themselves and the specific ways they abuse the markets. These include but are not
limited to artificially taking advantage of network effects, increasing the switching costs
for consumers by locking them into ecosystems, manipulating markets developed within
their technologies, tying products under the guise of platform efficiency, and the
unethical use of data amassed for price discrimination and advertisement. These are all
issues that antitrust bodies have to be specifically sensitive to in their future cases in
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order to fully prosecute all market abuses. While the paper has not recommended
remedies, it has hopefully aided in pointing out elements of information technology that
require more stringent analysis. Although it appears that certain schools of thought are
more likely influence more strict interpretations of competitive fairness and thus catch the
little nuances in information technology industries than others, it is important for any
legislative body to grasp the economics behind the changing technology and be flexible
in order to fully regulate this industry.

111

CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSION
This thesis evaluated two representative case studies and the associated literature
to conclude that antitrust regulatory bodies need to be more responsive to recognizing
how information technology facilitates anticompetitive behavior in information
technology monopolies. The literature surrounding information technology and their
unique behavior from Chapter 3 were supported by the findings in the Microsoft and
Google cases, where both the technology giants displayed similar patterns of market
misconducts, suggesting that it is of utmost importance for these behaviors to be taken
into consideration for any future antitrust analysis. The research also pinpointed some
specific elements of these monopolies that require further attention. Notably, it showed
how it is important to realize that information technology monopolies have radically
different initial growth incentives compared to their non-information technology
counterparts, where they are motivated by user growth instead of profits. Information
technology firms depend on network effects, and on top of that, their cost structures (i.e.
high initial fixed costs and low marginal costs) lead them to prioritize achieving
economies of scale rather than gain short-run profits. This changed the nature of
anticompetitive behaviors that were employed by information technology monopolies
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given that most of it was geared around creating artificial barriers of entries to stop new
entrants from taking advantage of the network effects needed to stay in the market.
The case studies showed the ways in which these monopolies employ such
anticompetitive behavior and how they were facilitated by the nature of their technology.
Microsoft did this by setting up “applications barriers to entry” where they created a
proprietary Java language to mislead programmers to only build Microsoft-only
applications to reduce the number of applications on all other platforms thus reducing the
marketability of their competitors.267 Both Microsoft and Google employed illegal
bundling of other products like Internet Explorer and Google Search under the guise of
platform efficiency.268 They both utilized exclusionary contracts with suppliers and
retailers to curtail competition in the market.269 Finally, both firms have coded in reduced
interoperability with rival products to increase switching costs to lock in users to their
platforms.270 There is also the fact that traditional anticompetitive tactics like price
discrimination are exacerbated when data collection is taken into account, which makes
price discrimination plans more accurate making consumers more vulnerable to
exploitation by these monopolies who have a greater store of data. Information
technology monopolies are capable of more market abuses and thus require more
oversight, it is thus imperative that antitrust regulatory bodies take note of these non-price
abuses when examining their market misconducts.
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While it is important to register a deeper understanding behind information
technology in order to recognize the full extent of abuses committed by information
technology monopolies and better implement antitrust legislation in this sector, it is also
important to remain flexible as certain elements in this field are still nebulous as it is a
rapidly developing sector. The case studies showed how the rigidity in the measures of
market concentration led to the failures in the prosecution of so many more levels of
market abuses. Though the Google cases displayed more nuanced interpretations271 of
relevant markets than the Microsoft case272 it still could have benefited from even more
flexibility. Information technology monopolies today tend to have markets built inside of
their platforms where they compete at every level of the market while wielding dominant
market power over the previous market levels (i.e. Google Phone > Google Android >
Google Playstore > Google Drive) making it hard for their rivals to compete. As newer
microlevels of markets are created, it is increasingly important to not ignore these
potential areas of market misconducts and instead assess the culmination of market
behavior by the dominant firm to see if they are abusive or not. Additionally, as more
literature around the economic valuation of data develops, antitrust bodies will have to
change how they evaluate market dominance and market abuses as information
technology monopolies tend to profit the most from the utilization and sale of data.
The decisions of the cases chosen were reflective of the two schools of thought
analyzed in Chapter 2, notably the Chicago School and the Post-Chicago School; it was
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important for the paper to recognize the economic thoughts considered by the legislative
bodies before they came to their decisions in order to see if either was more sensitive to
the nuances of information technology. The Chicago School’s prioritization of consumer
welfare and efficiency neglected harmful anticompetitive behavior like vertical market
integrations, tying and price discrimination.273 Whereas the Post-Chicago thinkers
recognized the detrimental effects of predatory pricing, identified the consequences that
might stem from the firms facing low marginal costs at economies of scale and also made
efforts to recognize strategic deterrence to entry.274 These additional contributions by the
Post-Chicago thinkers were visible in the decision-making processes of the European
regulatory bodies, where they paid careful attention to more non-price market abuses,
displayed flexibility in recognizing different markets and were generally more prone to
administering intervention. Despite this, there were still shortcomings in the decisions
made by the European Commission, but the literature they are influenced by does present
the hope that they could employ a more nuanced implementation of antitrust in
information technology in the future if they become a bit more sensitive to the economics
behind the technology itself. The case studies from this paper found that both the
regulatory bodies (though one more than the other) faced failures, however, it can be said
without a doubt that the antitrust legislators in the United States could benefit a fair
amount from distancing itself from their Chicago roots.
The goal of this paper was to remark on whether the current implementation of
antitrust laws in the information technology sector was sufficient. In doing so, the paper
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found the manner in which it was not and what issues the antitrust bodies need to be
vigilant of in their future analyses to improve their oversight. However, due to the limited
scope of this research, the paper could not explore the economic impact of potential
legislative solutions and their effect on competition and innovation, which could be a
point of further research. While this paper focused more on the recognition of market
abuses facilitated by information technology, it was merely the starting point for the
broader conversation around the creation of the antitrust remedies (i.e. fines, breaking up
companies, access to intellectual property, etc.) necessary for the formation of
competitive markets in this sector. Though not specifically pertaining to antitrust, some
of Mariana Mazzucato’s work on the state taking a share of the winnings of tech
monopolies (who benefited from government R&D) and reinvesting it on innovative
capabilities could be utilized in the creation of such antitrust remedies.275 Though this
paper only briefly touched on this topic, Mazzucatto identifies how the private sector is
not the sole source of innovation but that the state plays an important role in innovation
as well, and how it is vital to socialize the rewards when the risks of innovation have
been socialized by the state.276 Future research in this area can also make an effort to pay
attention to the weaknesses in the American antitrust approach, where the system effects
of judging costs and benefits at the sub-sectoral level are mostly ignored. The research
may also benefit from a focus on supply factors as it could create the opportunity to find
additional implications for antitrust in this sector. Given that so much of the innovation
and development at the earlier stages depend on government investments, one can argue
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that firms have a social responsibility that they must exercise. This could be potentially
be a point to develop stronger arguments in support of stricter antitrust remedies.
Fortunately, an intellectual movement has begun in the United States built around
enacting stronger antitrust measures against information technology monopolies and they
have started to examine the impacts of different legislative actions on competition. The
creation of the “New Brandeis School” was inspired by Justice Louis Brandeis from the
Wilson Era, who was strongly against market concentration and the curse of “bigness.”277
The New Brandeis Thinkers are a lot more sensitive to the malpractices of information
technology monopolies as they reject Chicago ideas and take on a more structuralist look
at market competition.278 This leads them to disproportionately estimate the negative
impact of market concentration alone (often HHI) compared to other schools of thought,
but it could be argued that given information technology monopolies have their market
abuses facilitated and incentivized by their scale, the estimates might not be too
exaggerated. Though it is in its early days, it will be interesting to see what research
comes forward from a school of antitrust thought strictly dedicated to the improvement of
the antitrust process in the information technology sector. There could be significant
research potential in examining all the different schools of antitrust and their impact on
competition and innovation in this sector to present more informed legislative
recommendations.
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At the time of writing this paper, there have been only a few notable antitrust
cases in this sector but it is still considerably sparse compared to the number of
monopolies and the breadth of market abuses seen today. However, it appears that both
the United States279 and the European Union280 along with other countries like Russia, 281
South Korea282 and others are planning to bring forth antitrust charges against information
technology monopolies in the near future. It is commendable that all these legislative
bodies are starting to recognize the threat that these information technology monopolies
pose, and are starting to consider intervening in the markets, but it is just as important
that the antitrust processes that they conduct are politically unbiased, informed about the
economics behind information technology and flexible to interpretations and
implementations of the law. The case studies have shown that the failure to adapt to the
changes in the technology-specific details is what led these antitrust bodies to not
recognize the bulk of the market abuses. Further research into this topic can examine if
the patterns of market abuses are present in other technology monopolies like Amazon,
Facebook and Apple are similar to those presented in this paper or if there are more such
behaviors that antitrust bodies need to be made aware of.283 The United States will be
bringing forward antitrust charges against Google in the late 2020s,284 one can hope that
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the legislative bodies have learnt their lessons from the events that transpired from the
Microsoft cases and followed the European cases closely. There has been much
contemplation regarding this upcoming era-defining case, especially regarding a potential
change of influences in the American antitrust applications. Though it is unlikely, there is
at least hope that their decisions this time around will be much more technically informed
and will set the constructive precedents needed for better implementation of antitrust
legislation in the information sector in the future.
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Appendix 1
A1

Relevant Market Definitions across the US and the EU
Competition policies and antitrust laws rely on the theoretical framework

surrounding market definitions and market concentrations. Being able to define markets
is immensely important for fostering competitive environments, but before market
concentrations can be measured, it is very important to navigate the ambiguous and often
arbitrary means through which relevant markets and market shares are defined. Market
definitions can often be the difference between whether a firm is a monopoly or not.
Markets are most often defined through product characteristic boundaries and geographic
boundaries which are measured by looking at either the demand substitutability or the
supply substitutability of the products between certain characteristics or locations.285 Both
the Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission have their own methods
for defining markets. Though, the basic theoretical approach is the same, some semantic
differences can be noted.
The European Commission employs very specific market definitions when
enforcing their antitrust laws. They combine the product markets and the geographic
market to define the relevant markets for their analyses. For them:
● a relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer by reason of the
products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use;
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● a relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the firms concerned are
involved in the supply of products or services and in which the conditions of
competition are sufficiently homogeneous.286
At first, the Commission checks whether two products belong to the same market or not
and then they attempt to determine whether they belong to the same geographic market
by looking at their market shares within a certain region and the price differential
between the products. Once this has been determined, a more detailed analysis is
undertaken by measuring both demand-supply substitutability and potential competition
faced by the products.
A market is competitive if customers can choose between a range of products
with similar characteristics and if the supplier does not face obstacles to supplying
products or services in the given market.287
For demand side substitution, they calculate whether a permanent small increase in prices
for one product would cause consumers to switch to the other product. If they switch,
they belong to the same market, whereas they don’t if the consumers do not switch. If the
market is not sufficiently competitive to begin with, they account for substantially
increased initial prices. On the supply side, substitutability is determined through a firm’s
ability to enter or switch production to products that are more relevant in the short term.
If the firms can easily switch their production between certain products, then the products
are not considered a part of a separate market. However, if there are other significant
obstacles in doing so (distribution, advertising, testing, etc.), this is examined separately
than the base supply side calculations.288 Once the markets are defined, then the analysis
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for whether effective competition is present in the markets is undertaken. Demand side
substitutions are determined by looking at evidences of substitutions in the recent past,
conducting quantitative tests (cross-price elasticities, similarity of price movements,
convergences, etc.), analyzing the views of customers and competitors, looking at
consumer preferences within multiple geographical samples, noting the extent of barriers
and costs of switching to substitutes for consumers (location, retooling, uncertainty about
other suppliers, etc.) and finally examining the price discrimination faced by
consumers.289
The geographic dimension of the markets are analyzed by looking at past
evidence of price changes in different locations, noting patterns in demand characteristics
(culture, lifestyle, local preferences, etc.), evaluating the views of both customers and
competitors, looking at geographic patterns of purchases or examining trade flows when
geographic patterns are too large to be established and finally identifying the barriers to
entry and the cost for switching production (which can get complex since certain costs
can be offset by other costs e.g. labor vs. transport costs).290
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice enforce antitrust laws, although private parties and state governments also bring
forth charges as well. While the theoretical framework behind markets definitions have
been improved upon with each case handled, there is a general guideline that the FTC and
the DOJ follow. They note that for some products, multiple relevant markets are often
considered when considering the impact on competition. It should be noted that their
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guidelines primarily focus on demand substitution factors, considering supply side factors
only in the identification of market participants and the measurement of market shares.291
The FTC guidelines on market analysis specifically focus on the elasticity of
substitute goods. They primarily analyze the prices of the products, consumer behavior
and business sales data to determine the competitive nature of the market. 292Price and
consumer behavior are big determining factors since high prices and the consumer’s
inability to switch to an alternative may indicate a higher concentration of market shares.
Demand side substitutability calculations similar to those in the European Union are
undertaken to analyze this. Though the primary focus is on the demand side, certain
supply side factors are also taken into consideration, such as geographical location of the
market and the shipping capabilities of the particular businesses in question. This is used
to determine the geographical radius of the market and is done so by noting consumer
sales patterns (if it is centered around a certain region) and the business’s shipping
abilities (if they sell where they manufacture or if they have the capacity to import
elsewhere).293 Often times, the legislative bodies in the United States will employ
hypothetical monopoly tests and critical loss ratio analyses to examine relevant markets
as well (these are noted in Appendix 2). The definitions for product markets and
geographic markets are ultimately mostly the same, the main differences between the two
institutions make themselves visible in the ways that applications emphasize different
tests more than others.
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Appendix 2
A2

Relevant Market Concentration Calculations and Monopoly Tests

A2 (i) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Despite its efficacy being widely debated, both the Federal Trade Commission294
and the European Commission295 have utilized the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a
measurement of market concentration (usually mentioned more in the case of merger
analyses) on top of comparing the bulk percentage of market share held by companies.
Despite using the same measure, the two institutions do have different set thresholds for
what they consider to be minimally concentrated versus highly concentrated.
%"#
!
𝐻𝐻𝐼!" = % 𝑀𝑆#,"
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#∈!
!
Where, 𝑀𝑆#,"
is the market share of firm i in year t and industry s.296 HHI calculated by

squaring the market shares of all of the firms competing in a certain industry and
summing their total. Theoretically, for a perfectly competitive industry, the HHI would
be 0, but for a perfect monopoly it would be 10,000
(100% market share under one firm). The table below depicts the thresholds that the
United States and European Union consider to be concentrated.
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Table A2. (i)

United States297

European Union298

Not concentrated

<1500

<1000

Mildly concentrated

1500 - 2500

1000 - 2000

Highly concentrated

> 2500

>2000

A2 (ii) Lerner Index
The Lerner index is used to measure the degree to which price of a product
exceeds marginal costs, though not widely used in the United States, it is sometimes used
in European antitrust analyses to see the extent of markups employed by monopoly firms.
As noted in the paper, the Lerner index is not a viable measure for goods with negligible
marginal costs like software products.

𝐿 =

𝑃 − 𝑀𝐶
1
=
|𝐸|
𝑃

Where P is price, MC is marginal cost and E is price elasticity of the product.
A2 (iii)Monopoly Tests
A lot of the literature surrounding the measurement of market concentration and
the identification of relevant markets focus around mergers primarily. This is why the
analytical tools used to analyze the levels of market concentrations emerge from those
areas, this includes estimates of critical loss, price discrimination, price effects due to the
entry of a new competitor and consumer behavior.299 This section will make note of a few
297
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important ones that are administered by the legal bodies in both the European Union and
the United States.
(a) SSNIP Test (also called hypothetical monopoly test): This checks if a
hypothetical imposition of a small significant but non-transitory price (SSNIP) on
one or more products in a candidate market would raise the hypothetical
monopolist’s profits for a certain period of time. The effect on sales of the
substitutes allows the legal bodies to infer the level of concentration in relevant
markets.300 Though this is not necessarily full-proof given that it does not account
for degree of substitutability.301 So for example, the test could check the impact on
monopoly profits of a price increase of 5% over 12 months.
(b) Critical Loss Ratio Analysis: It analyzes the amount of percentage loss in sales
needed for a price increase to be unprofitable. It can be used to measure
anticompetitive effects and also find relevant markets. However, it lacks in its
ability to account for cross-price elasticities of demand amongst other issues.
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Appendix 3
A3

Relevant Technology Definitions

Operating System: The main software that controls the primary operation of a computer
and allows the functioning of programs by assigning memory space and controlling input
and output functions.302
Mobile Operating System: An operating system built exclusively for mobile devices. It
is responsible for defining mobile device features and functions and serves as a platform
for the use of mobile applications. 303Can be exclusive and integrated to specific phones
like iOS for Apple iPhones or can be licensable to other mobile devices like Google
Android.
Graphical User Interface: It is a user interface that includes graphical elements, such as
windows, icons and buttons. This distinction was necessary as command line interfaces
was the norm before.304 The availability of the graphical user interfaces made it easier for
common consumers to confidently operate personal computers in the 1970s.
Software Environment or Ecosystem: A platform that is host to multiple other
compatible software applications. Can be a desktop operating system, a mobile operating
system, a cloud-based or web-based platform as well.
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Software Applications: Software programs developed for users for various
functionalities that run on operating systems, mobile operating systems or web-based
platforms.
Mobile Application Store: A mobile operating system application which allows users to
download other mobile software applications. Notably Google Playstore and Apple App
Store.
Web Browser: It is an application used to access and view websites on the internet.
305

Different from mobile web browsers which are used to run the same function on mobile

phones (a different platform).
Platform: A platform is a group of technologies that are used as a base upon which
other applications, processes or technologies are developed.306
Work-group Server: It is a peer-to-peer network system. All the connected computers
on the system are allowed to access shared resources such as network files, system
resources and hardware like printers.307
General Search Services: These services are provided by search engines like Google,
Bing or DuckDuckGo to help users find relevant websites when they enter specific terms
onto search bars. This is done by indexing large databases of websites based on titles,
keywords, text in the pages and user activity. 308
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Vertical Search Services: A web-based search engine that indexes specialized content.
This functions similarly to search engines, except the databases are more suited to
narrower search queries like finding airplane prices or restaurants in an area. 309
Android Fork: Since Google Android is a licensable mobile operating system, they
allow developers to make customizations to their software to better suit their devices. An
Android fork is simply a custom iteration of the Google Android mobile operating
system. Most notably, the Amazon Fire OS.
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Appendix 4
A4

List of Applicable Laws
Though, there are many laws that fall under the umbrella of antitrust laws (such as

merger guidelines) that play a role in regulating monopolistic behavior, this section
makes note of the specific antitrust laws in the United States and European Union
relevant to the case studies analyzed in this paper.
2.3.1 (a) United States
Sherman Antitrust Act (1890)
§ 1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.310
§ 2: Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony[...]311

2.3.1 (b) European Union
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices
or any other trading conditions;
(b)limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
— any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
310
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— any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
— any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.312

Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(previously Article 82 of the Treaty of the European Economic Community)
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.313

Article 54 of European Economic Area Agreement
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the territory covered by this
Agreement or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the functioning of
this Agreement in so far as it may affect trade between Contracting Parties. Such abuse may, in
particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts.314
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